Nasrallah admits he made mistake when kidnapping soldiers

[Guest bengalrick]

[url="http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/08/27/mideast.nasrallah/"]click here[/url]

[i][b][size=3]Nasrallah: Soldiers' abductions a mistake[/size][/b]
POSTED: 10:07 p.m. EDT, August 27, 2006


BEIRUT, Lebanon (CNN) -- [b]Had Hezbollah known how Israel was going to respond, the group would not have captured two Israeli soldiers last month in northern Israel, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said Sunday.[/b]

[b]But, in an interview with Lebanon's New TV, Nasrallah also said the war would have happened anyway -- a few months later. [/b]

He insisted, without offering evidence, that Israel had been planning to launch military action in October, and the July raid by Hezbollah merely moved up the Israelis' timetable. [color="#FF0000"](in other words, gave them a reason)[/color]

In a raid into Israel on July 12, Hezbollah militants killed three Israeli soldiers and abducted two others.

That attack sparked a response that the Israelis said was intended to target Hezbollah militants, but which resulted in the killing of more than 1,000 Lebanese -- most of them civilians -- and the widespread destruction of the country's infrastructure. The death toll among Israelis was 159, including 41 civilians.

[b]If someone had said July 11 that there was "a one percent possibility" Israel's military response would be as extensive as it turned out to be, "I would say no, I would not have entered this for many reasons -- military, social, political, economic," said Nasrallah, speaking in Arabic.[/b]

Not even the families of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel would have wanted to bring on such action, he said.

[b]"If there was a one percent possibility, we would not have done that. We would not have done any capturing."[/b]

[b]But, he added, "If we hadn't captured those soldiers, the war would have come in October anyway." Hezbollah's raid drew Israeli action sooner and "deprived the Israelis of the element of surprise," he said.[/b]

"The Israelis wanted to begin this war," Nasrallah said, calling it "an American decision" with "many European countries" involved. He insisted Israel was looking for "an Arab cover."

When Israel launched major military action after the raid, it cited the kidnappings and months of sporadic rocket attacks by Hezbollah into northern Israel.

In an interview Sunday that lasted more than 80 minutes, Nasrallah again declared "victory" in the monthlong war with Israel.

He called it a "bigger" victory than Hezbollah had achieved in 2000, when Israel withdrew after 18 years in Lebanon -- and many throughout the Arab world credited Hezbollah's resistance efforts.

After 2000, questions remained as to whether Hezbollah could resist Israel if it chose to re-enter southern Lebanon, he said. The fact that the group withstood Israel's military onslaught, he argued, represented "a huge victory."

Nasrallah expressed no regret for the deaths of Israeli civilians, saying Lebanon was the victim of Israeli aggression.

He said he did not expect major fighting to re-emerge soon, saying indications were that Israel was not gearing up for such action.

Nasrallah also said negotiations aimed at prisoner swaps had begun, with Nabih Berri -- a Lebanese parliamentarian who frequently serves as a go-between with Hezbollah -- as the group's negotiator.

Despite Israel's reports that many Hezbollah fighters and officials were captured or killed, Nasrallah said, "the public leadership of Hezbollah -- they're all well, thank God. If the war had happened in October, it would not be like that."

The U.N. cease-fire resolution that ended the war calls for Hezbollah to be disarmed south of the Litani River. It is unclear whether Hezbollah -- which calls for Israel's destruction -- will comply. Nasrallah gave no indication.

But he said U.N. envoy Terje Roed-Larsen, who is working to implement the resolution, "serves the Israelis first and foremost."

Roed-Larsen has said he seeks the U.N. goal of peace for both Lebanon and Israel.

Hezbollah is listed by the United States and Israel as a terrorist organization. It has been linked to attacks against U.S. and other Western targets, including the 1983 bombings of U.S. Marine barracks that killed 241 and the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Argentina that killed 95. [/i]



he admits he planned the kidnapping, and that it hurt him politically, militarily, social, and economic reasons... very intriguing, indeed...

[JBandJoeyV]

The interview was obviously a fake by the CIA

[Guest bengalrick]

[quote name='CJandRudiJ' post='325158' date='Aug 28 2006, 04:52 PM']The interview was obviously a fake by the CIA[/quote]

on a serious note, that is about the only thing that makes what he said make sense.... very strange for him to admit this stuff, even if he believes it... i really can't think of a good reason he would do it, unless he is getting massive amounts of criticism from the lebanese people, and he's trying to save his hide...

[Jamie_B]

Isreal isnt in Southern Lebonon anymore, Hezbollah accomplished that goal.

The real losers of the war were Lebonon's people.

[Guest bengalrick]

[quote name='Jamie_B' post='325164' date='Aug 28 2006, 04:59 PM']Isreal isnt in Southern Lebonon anymore, Hezbollah accomplished that goal.

The real losers of the war were Lebonon's people.[/quote]

agree w/ one thing for sure: the losers were the lebanese people... they would only win if israel left (they supposidely did in 2000), syria left (they supposidely did last year) and if hezballoh leaves (hasn't happened yet, and not looking good)... knowing that lebanon would win if hezbollah was transplanted from their country, is it a stretch to say that israel was fighting for lebanon's freedoms?? yes, it really is, considering their tactics... but they are certainly fighting more for lebanon than hez was...

[Homer_Rice]

[quote name='bengalrick' post='325171' date='Aug 28 2006, 05:09 PM']agree w/ one thing for sure: the losers were the lebanese people... they would only win if israel left (they supposidely did in 2000), syria left (they supposidely did last year) and if [b]hezballoh leaves [/b] (hasn't happened yet, and not looking good)... knowing that lebanon would win if hezbollah was transplanted from their country, is it a stretch to say that israel was fighting for lebanon's freedoms?? yes, it really is, considering their tactics... but they are certainly fighting more for lebanon than hez was...[/quote]

Do you just refuse to pay attention, br? We've just witnessed this mini-explosion which does not bode well for the middle east as a whole, and you still don't know that Hezbollah are Lebanese? That Nasrullah is not a pawn of Syria or Iran any more than Ho Chi Minh was a pawn of the Chinese and Soviets?

To even suggest that Israel was fighting for the "freedoms" of Lebanon is flat out crazy. It's one thing to disagree with the actions of one or another group in a dispute. It's another thing to not even be able to take a reasonable assessment of the facts of the situation. You should go find your mother and tell her to spank you.

[Chris Henrys Dealer]

The statements by Nasrallah are just an attempt to curry favour with the moderate Lebanese and partially the international community. He realises that the biggest threat to him, now that Israel is curtailed for the time being is from the Lebanese people themselves from where he drew so much support. The biggest threat to the Hezbollah is an erosion of the grassroots support that they enjoy amongst the Lebanese population. Especially amongst the Christians of the country.

A lot of people are pissed at him and the Israelis as well due to what happened. By making these statements, he tries to portray himself as being a leader who does care for the Lebanese people overall, is congnizant of their plight, and not some mad man hell bent on destroying Israel, no matter what the cost is to Lebanon.

It's a purely political statement. While some Hezbollah leaders / members might indeed feel bad about what happened...an equally large number are rejoicing at the loss of face that Israel has somewhat suffered in the conflict and in the international media.

The way Lt Gen Dan Halutz, the Israeli army chief is being grilled and criticized in his own country now, shows just how pissed so many Israeli's are at the way the situation was handled.

[Guest bengalrick]

[quote name='Homer_Rice' post='325190' date='Aug 28 2006, 05:32 PM']Do you just refuse to pay attention, br? We've just witnessed this mini-explosion which does not bode well for the middle east as a whole, and you still don't know that Hezbollah are Lebanese? That Nasrullah is not a pawn of Syria or Iran any more than Ho Chi Minh was a pawn of the Chinese and Soviets?

To even suggest that Israel was fighting for the "freedoms" of Lebanon is flat out crazy. It's one thing to disagree with the actions of one or another group in a dispute. It's another thing to not even be able to take a reasonable assessment of the facts of the situation. You should go find your mother and tell her to spank you. [/quote]

i saw what you saw... it was a fair question, considering hez didn't literally "win" anything, except that they aren't dead...

the only thing that would bode well w/ the middle east, is the destruction of hezballoh... since that didn't happen, nor probably will happen, then yes your right, it is bad news for the middle east at this point... the effects of the war are going to lead us to who won and who lost... we'll all see, and it will be obvious for everyone, i think...

you don't think that hezballoh is a pawn of iran homer? we disagree on this point then... they are funded, and take orders from iran imo...

[Jamie_B]

I give up.

Go Israel!! Take that land!!! Ohh yeaahhh!!! Fuck dem A-rabs!!!

[Guest bengalrick]

[quote name='Jamie_B' post='325915' date='Aug 29 2006, 02:12 PM']I give up.

Go Israel!! Take that land!!! Ohh yeaahhh!!! Fuck dem A-rabs!!![/quote]

right back at ya jamie... go hezballoh!!! get them zionists!!!

if israel wanted to take the land, they could... they don't for good reason.... THEY DON"T WANT IT!!! if they did, they would have kept it they 3 times since the 60's they did control the land... what about the road map to peace plan? wasn't israel giving up a majority of the land that the UN gave them in the past? but yeah, they are just trying to take the damn a-rabs land!!!

[Jamie_B]

[quote name='bengalrick' post='325944' date='Aug 29 2006, 02:35 PM']right back at ya jamie... go hezballoh!!! get them zionists!!!

if israel wanted to take the land, they could... they don't for good reason.... THEY DON"T WANT IT!!! if they did, they would have kept it they 3 times since the 60's they did control the land... what about the road map to peace plan? wasn't israel giving up a majority of the land that the UN gave them in the past? but yeah, they are just trying to take the damn a-rabs land!!![/quote]


Yes rick because I have so clearly said I believe its a Zionist issue, I must be one of them "joo haters" (I hope you would know be better by now), rather than a land grab one, or an apartite one. Come on man I have posted 1 article on Zionism that I said I didnt even read before hand, because I know the topic interests some. However to go as far as saying they control everything reads like a Dan Brown novel to me.

Your allowing the antisemtism arguement to muddy the truth.

[Guest BlackJesus]

[quote name='Jamie_B' post='325915' date='Aug 29 2006, 02:12 PM']I give up.

Go Israel!! Take that land!!! Ohh yeaahhh!!! Fuck dem A-rabs!!![/quote]


[b]Take a step back from falling off the truth cliff Jamie .... you may end up branded an anti-semite. [img]http://forum.go-bengals.com/public/style_emoticons//37.gif[/img]


Israel is our friend .... they just spy, steal secrets, and use our army as cannon fodder = Because they love us [/b]

[Jamie_B]

Good article, I may pick up this book.

[url="http://uncpress.unc.edu/chapters/hahn_caught.html"]http://uncpress.unc.edu/chapters/hahn_caught.html[/url]

[quote]Because of the Cold War, the United States became deeply involved in the Middle East after 1945. Committed to containing communism around the globe, the Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower administrations strove to maintain access to petroleum resources, military bases, and lines of communication in the Middle East and to deny these assets to the Soviet Union. Under these two presidents, the United States also sought to promote peace in the region, to sustain governments supportive of Western political objectives, and to maintain a liberal economic system conducive to U.S. commercial interests. In short, U.S. officials sought stability in the Middle East on behalf of their objectives in the region and around the world. Stability in the region, these leaders assumed, would help them safeguard their vital interests and prevail in the Cold War. Conversely, they feared that instability would open the region to Soviet influence, ruin indigenous goodwill toward the West, and possibly spark another world war.

The Arab-Israeli conflict directly threatened Middle East stability in the late 1940s and 1950s. Unrelenting antagonism triggered two wars and numerous skirmishes. Peace proved elusive as leaders on both sides expressed a preference for conflict over compromise. Israel refused to repatriate Arab Palestinian refugees, who became a political cause for the leaders of Arab states. Restrictions on trade and shipping and disagreements about territorial boundaries and waterways embittered all of the protagonists. The conflict destabilized the Middle East and thereby imperiled U.S. vital interests.

This book analyzes U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1945 to 1961. To stabilize the Middle East, U.S. officials sought in principle to resolve the conflict. They worked to avert Arab-Israeli hostilities and to end the wars that erupted in 1948 and 1956. In the interim, the U.S. government tried to negotiate permanent peace settlements among the belligerents and resolved to settle specific controversies regarding borders, the treatment of Palestinian refugees, Israeli access to Arab waterways, the dispensation of Jordan River water, and the status of Jerusalem. In short, U.S. officials wished to end the Arab-Israeli conflict before it damaged American interests.

Despite the importance of Arab-Israeli peace to regional stability, however, U.S. officials subsumed their peacemaking to other Cold War interests. The U.S. government tempered its dedication to conflict resolution with a determination to deny the Soviets any opportunity to gain political influence in the Middle East. The United States refrained from imposing stringent peace terms on either side and eventually even tolerated the conflict in an effort to safeguard the country's relationships with Middle East states and to steer them away from Moscow. The United States prioritized anti-Soviet containment over Arab-Israeli settlement, preferring a region in conflict under U.S. hegemony to a region at peace under Soviet influence.

In the end, the United States failed to resolve the overall Arab-Israeli conflict or any of its specific disputes. Failure resulted in part from the deep reluctance of the Arab states and Israel to make concessions or compromises but also resulted from the United States' self-imposed restraints on peacemaking, which undermined its moral and political credibility in the eyes of local states. U.S. peace initiatives occasionally deepened the conflict by aggravating the passions of the principals and accentuating their disagreements. Despite U.S. efforts to resolve the conflict, peace remained elusive.

While confronting this peacemaking conundrum, the United States became inextricably involved in the Middle East. As they resisted communism worldwide, U.S. leaders assigned increasing strategic and political importance to the Middle East. They gradually assumed the duty of defending Western interests there, even at the risk of war against the Soviet Union or a local state. In short, the Cold War compelled the United States to make deep and enduring commitments to regional security. By 1961, the United States found itself caught in the Middle East, unable to escape the responsibilities that American leaders had assumed.

The United States also became caught in the middle of the Arab-Israeli conflict. U.S. officials felt compelled by their global containment policy to intercede in the Arab-Israeli conflict and to preserve sound relations with all sides of the dispute. Operating within the limits set by U.S. anti-Soviet policy, however, American officials proved unable to accomplish a peace settlement and in the process of trying strained relations with both sides. Snared in the middle of a nasty fight, the United States found it impossible to arbitrate a settlement or to avoid the combatants' resentment.

The United States remained trapped in the middle of the Arab-Israeli conflict because American policy emanated from two distinct and conflicting perspectives. One impulse took root in the State and Defense Departments. Driven by such national security concerns as containment, access to military bases, and preservation of oil sources, adherents to this approach advocated close relations with Arab states. The second impulse centered on the White House staff and Congress. Reflecting such domestic concerns as electoral politics, public opinion, and cultural values, proponents of this position favored close relations with Israel. As U.S. policy regarding the Arab-Israeli situation evolved, these competing impulses struggled for the president's mind.

Competition between the national security and domestic impulses significantly shaped U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. This competition frequently resulted in U.S. policies that were compromises between the pro-Israel and pro-Arab perspectives, a tendency that rendered the United States unable to side with one antagonist over the other or find a solution to the conflict that both sides would accept.

Between 1945 and 1961, Presidents Truman and Eisenhower laid the foundations of a U.S. Middle Eastern policy that endured for decades. To apply anticommunist containment doctrine to the Middle East, these presidents accepted responsibilities for the stability and security of the region that lasted beyond the end of the Cold War. Truman's and Eisenhower's involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict began an enduring U.S. effort to make peace in the region. By 1961, the United States had developed a policy of supporting conservative regimes and resisting radical revolutions in the Middle East, a policy that persisted—in that and other regions of the Third World—until the twenty-first century. This examination of the Truman-Eisenhower era thus clarifies the foundations of long-term U.S. policy in the Middle East.

This book analyzes U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, developing several important themes. First, distinctions exist between the policy making of Truman and that of Eisenhower. An unsteady president distracted by momentous developments around the world, Truman usually made decisions about the Middle East in reaction to events there. Consequently, his policy often appeared ambivalent and inconsistent. In contrast, Eisenhower, who became president when Cold War tensions had stabilized, devoted personal attention to the Middle East, proactively made policy, and showed more consistency. Despite such differences, these two presidents shared a determination to privilege Cold War security concerns over peacemaking ventures, and both dealt relatively evenly with Israel and the Arab states.

Second, this book examines the domestic political context in which U.S. officials made foreign policy, assessing the prodigious lobbying on behalf of Israel by U.S. citizens, members of Congress, and private interest groups and, where possible, measuring Israel's influence in mobilizing such support. Because the lobbying often conflicted with what officials in the State and Defense Departments defined as national interests, those officials resented and resisted the pressure. This study elucidates how the diplomats balanced their foreign policy aims with domestic political restraints.

The evolution of U.S.-Israeli relations forms a third theme of this study. Many scholars describe the U.S.-Israeli relationship as "special" because of instances of U.S. support for Israel and because of the deep sympathy for Israel in U.S. public opinion.[1] While acknowledging such special ties, this book stresses that disagreements on security-related issues involving the Arab states generated friction and acrimony in the official relationship. In this sense, this work offers an important corrective to the special-relationship thesis.

Although not a work of Israeli history per se, my analysis speaks indirectly to a controversy among scholars of Israeli relations with the Arab states. For decades, the prevailing body of scholarship sympathetically portrayed Israel's foreign policy as defensive, justified, reasonable, and wise.[2] This "orthodox" school came under sharp attack in the late 1980s when a younger generation of Israeli scholars, called the revisionist or "new" historians, critically evaluated Israeli diplomacy as provocative if not aggressive, unjustified in its treatment of Palestinians, and regrettable.[3] Publication of revisionist scholarship provoked intense resistance from defenders of the orthodox school as well as an impassioned debate among scholars and citizens in Israel and elsewhere.[4] Although not intended to be revisionist history, this book does not refrain from discussing aspects of Israeli history that the orthodox school has either denied or glossed over.

A fourth theme of this book is U.S. relations with the Arab states that most directly challenged Israel—Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.[5] Conflict with Israel fueled the growth of Arab nationalism, which spawned revolutionary unrest in several states, radicalized significant Arab constituencies, threatened Western economic interests, and encouraged neutralism in the Cold War. The United States sought to preserve conservative Arab regimes and to stem the growth of Arab nationalism while avoiding what U.S. officials considered the unfathomable step of completely abandoning Israel. This volume assesses the U.S. effort to reach these goals in the Arab world.

U.S.-Arab relations evolved in a context of great dynamism in intra-Arab relationships. Between 1945 and 1961, tension developed as Arab powers expressed a desire for transnational unity but engaged in political conflicts. The Arab League, founded in 1944-45 to promote pan-Arab solidarity, declined in importance by the early 1950s. In its place, Bruce Maddy-Weitzman explains, Arab national leaders built a regional balance of power marked by "loosely structured, shifting coalitions derived from temporarily shared interests." Although the Arab states shared such ideologies as pan-Arab unity, revolutionary socialism, and anticolonialism, Malcolm Kerr suggests that by the late 1950s these countries engaged in "a dreary and inconclusive cold war" among themselves that overshadowed their relationships with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Israel. This book evaluates U.S.-Arab relations in the context of this intra-Arab cold war.[6]

Finally, this work analyzes the influence of the Anglo-U.S. relationship on U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. The United States considered Britain its closest ally in the Cold War, but U.S. and British views toward the Arab-Israeli controversy often conflicted. Moreover, the 1945-61 period witnessed the sharp decline of the British Empire and the rise of the United States as a global power. This book elucidates the manner in which U.S. officials resolved inconsistencies between the demands of the Atlantic alliance and American national objectives in the Middle East at a time when the relative power of the United States and Britain reversed.[7]

This book, in short, analyzes the evolution of U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute during the first two presidential administrations after World War II. The volume assesses how U.S. officials approached the regional conflict and why they implemented certain policies toward it and explains the making of U.S. policy in its global, regional, and binational dimensions. While focused mainly on diplomatic and security issues, this work also addresses the domestic political and cultural dimensions of U.S. policy, explaining why the United States failed to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and assessing this failure's impact on American interests in the Middle East and elsewhere.

The book is organized in such a way as to draw attention to several facets of U.S. policy during this era. Part I summarizes the pre-1945 origins of the Arab-Zionist controversy and U.S. involvement in it (chapter 1) and examines the Truman administration's approach to Palestine through 1949 in the context of U.S. global concerns during the early Cold War (chapters 2-4). These chapters aim for brevity since much of the literature on U.S. policy toward Palestine has concentrated on the years preceding Israeli independence in 1948.

Part II examines Truman's policy in 1949-53, when the president made several momentous decisions regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict (and a period that has received much less scholarly attention than the preceding four years). Chapter 5 assesses regional and global concerns that shaped Truman's thinking about the Arab-Israeli conflict, and chapters 6-9 study the development of the president's policy regarding such points of controversy as borders, refugees, and Jerusalem, among others. Chapter 10 evaluates the impact of the conflict on U.S. relations with Israel and the Arab states.

Part III analyzes Eisenhower's policy during his first administration. Chapter 11 examines the regional context of U.S. policy in the mid-1950s, and chapters 12-14 evaluate Eisenhower's efforts to resolve specific Arab-Israeli disputes and to negotiate a comprehensive peace settlement. U.S. policy during and after the 1956-57 Suez-Sinai War forms the subject of chapters 15 and 16.

Part IV analyzes the late Eisenhower period. Chapters 17-19 establish the regional context of U.S. policy and evaluate the president's policy toward specific Arab-Israeli disputes and crises. Chapter 20 evaluates the evolution of U.S. relations with Israel and the Arab states during the Eisenhower years.

While preparing this book, I aspired to honor the noble ideal among diplomatic historians of conducting research in multiple archives and in multiple countries. Within the United States, I examined the papers of Truman and Eisenhower as well as the records of the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and various individual diplomats. Consulting such a wide range of sources proved invaluable, revealing how key officials balanced domestic concerns against overseas goals, diplomatic objectives against security imperatives, and bureaucratic ambitions against the national interest. I also conducted extensive research in the archives of Israel (most of which are in Hebrew) and Britain. These records revealed the foreign wellsprings of U.S. diplomacy, the overseas impact of that diplomacy, and other features of U.S. policy that remain shrouded in U.S. archives. (No official records of the Arab states were available when I conducted research for this book.) I hope that such research gives this book distinctive breadth and depth.[8]

It is difficult to write about the Arab-Israeli conflict because the subject remains controversial. Not merely an academic, historical issue, it continues to generate passionate debate among citizens and scholars who identify with one side or the other in the current conflict. In writing this book, I have attempted to remain impartial, agreeing with Mark Tessler that the conflict "is not a struggle between good and evil but rather a controversy between two peoples who deserve recognition and respect, neither of whom has a monopoly on behavior that is either praiseworthy or condemnable."[9] In short, this book seeks to empathize with all sides to the Arab-Israeli dispute but to sympathize with none.[/quote]

[Guest bengalrick]

[quote name='Jamie_B' post='325964' date='Aug 29 2006, 02:49 PM']Yes rick because I have so clearly said I believe its a Zionist issue, I must be one of them "joo haters" (I hope you would know be better by now), rather than a land grab one, or an apartite one. Come on man I have posted 1 article on Zionism that I said I didnt even read before hand, because I know the topic interests some. However to go as far as saying they control everything reads like a Dan Brown novel to me.

Your allowing the antisemtism arguement to muddy the truth.[/quote]

don't make comments like "Fuck dem A-rabs!!!" and expect a fair nice post back from me brother... i don't appreciate your round about way of calling me a racist...

the truth is that the lebanese people suffered b/c of the stupid mistakes and acts of hezballoh, and the preceding attacks on lebanese territory by israel..

what the hell am i muddying? why don't you criticize hezballoh as a major cause for this war?

[Jamie_B]

[quote name='bengalrick' post='325999' date='Aug 29 2006, 03:36 PM']don't make comments like "Fuck dem A-rabs!!!" and expect a fair nice post back from me brother... i don't appreciate your round about way of calling me a racist...

the truth is that the lebanese people suffered b/c of the stupid mistakes and acts of hezballoh, and the preceding attacks on lebanese territory by israel..

what the hell am i muddying? why don't you criticize hezballoh as a major cause for this war?[/quote]


I dont believe your a racist rick, the purpose of me saying that was to jolt you into understanding thats what your calling people who disagree that anti-zionism = jew hatred. Its no different.

If zionism = jews ... why do we see there are different types of zionism? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zionism#Types_of_Zionism). Christian Zionisits? How can a Christian be a Jew?

I understand why hezballoah exists and why they use the tatics they do, even if I disagree with the tatics. Im not entirely sure you do.

[Guest Coy Bacon]

[quote name='bengalrick' post='325671' date='Aug 29 2006, 09:31 AM']i saw what you saw... it was a fair question, considering hez didn't literally "win" anything, except that they aren't dead...

the only thing that would bode well w/ the middle east, is the destruction of hezballoh... since that didn't happen, nor probably will happen, then yes your right, it is bad news for the middle east at this point... the effects of the war are going to lead us to who won and who lost... we'll all see, and it will be obvious for everyone, i think...

you don't think that hezballoh is a pawn of iran homer? we disagree on this point then... they are funded, and take orders from iran imo...[/quote]


What would bode better for the Middle East might be the destruction - or better yet, voluntary removal - of Israel. Israel is a pawn of the US - or vice versa - actually, both are pawns of more narrowly defined interests. Iran doesn't invade people and nuke civilian populations, so I'm probably a bit more comfortable with their pawns than I am of those that belong to the forces occupying the US and Israel.

[Guest bengalrick]

[quote name='Jamie_B' post='326001' date='Aug 29 2006, 03:41 PM']I dont believe your a racist rick, the purpose of me saying that was to jolt you into understanding thats what your calling people who disagree that anti-zionism = jew hatred. Its no different.

I understand why hezballoah exists and why they use the tatics they do, even if I disagree with the tatics. Im not entirely sure you do.[/quote]

i understand WHY they use these tactics, but i disagree w/ them 100%... i can see why they do it, b/c it is their only chance at "winning"... their other chance is to slowly build theirselves up (like we did) and beat us at our own game in a decade or so... kind of like what china is doing... hezballoh is exposing the people that are supposidely protecting, to get fast results... they are using tactics like terrorism and assymetric warfare to "win"... the problem i have w/ this strategy, is the lebanese people (and palestinian people) are the ones that are really affected by it... i too understand why they exist... they exist as a rebuttal to israel, which does place a consider amount of blame on israel, but NOT for what actions that hezballoh does... israel can't be blamed for the tactics that hezbollah uses... that is solely on hez's sole...

i am not trying to make that point... there is reason to be mad at the israeli lobbies... they have a considerable amount of power... however, if you say "zionists aren't the same as jews" and then in another post later on, you say "you must be jewish" or "we should throw bacon at them" or change every thread in this section, into a "anti-zionists" rant... to me, its like someone saying "i'm not racist, you fucking n---r" ummm, yeah you are!!!

<edit> btw, after hearing your explaination, i still feel the need to apolgize to you for possibly overreacting... i'm not having a great day, to say the least...

[Guest Coy Bacon]

[quote name='Jamie_B' post='326001' date='Aug 29 2006, 03:41 PM']I dont believe your a racist rick, the purpose of me saying that was to jolt you into understanding thats what your calling people who disagree that anti-zionism = jew hatred. Its no different.

If zionism = jews ... why do we see there are different types of zionism? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zionism#Types_of_Zionism). Christian Zionisits? How can a Christian be a Jew?

I understand why hezballoah exists and why they use the tatics they do, even if I disagree with the tatics. Im not entirely sure you do.[/quote]


I don't understand for the life of me why the guy objects to being called a racist. If everything were as he seems to believe it is, he would be the first to proudly stand up and say, "HELL YES, I'M A RACIST!" if he had any hanging down things. I guess he's just confused.

[Jamie_B]

[quote name='bengalrick' post='326014' date='Aug 29 2006, 04:08 PM']i understand WHY they use these tactics, but i disagree w/ them 100%... i can see why they do it, b/c it is their only chance at "winning"... their other chance is to slowly build theirselves up (like we did) and beat us at our own game in a decade or so... kind of like what china is doing... hezballoh is exposing the people that are supposidely protecting, to get fast results... they are using tactics like terrorism and assymetric warfare to "win"... the problem i have w/ this strategy, is the lebanese people (and palestinian people) are the ones that are really affected by it... i too understand why they exist... they exist as a rebuttal to israel, which does place a consider amount of blame on israel, but NOT for what actions that hezballoh does... israel can't be blamed for the tactics that hezbollah uses... that is solely on hez's sole...

i am not trying to make that point... there is reason to be mad at the israeli lobbies... they have a considerable amount of power... however, if you say "zionists aren't the same as jews" and then in another post later on, you say "you must be jewish" or "we should throw bacon at them" or change every thread in this section, into a "anti-zionists" rant... to me, its like someone saying "i'm not racist, you fucking n---r" ummm, yeah you are!!!

<edit> btw, after hearing your explaination, i still feel the need to apolgize to you for possibly overreacting... i'm not having a great day, to say the least...[/quote]


You dont need to appologize, you and I share a number of things we do agree wholeheartly on (mostly social issues) this isnt one of them.

As far as the 2nd paragraph, that is one person, not everyone in here that is anti-zionist is saying that.

Hell I dont even know that I am anti-zionist (for the purpose of this defition I mean against the exisitance of isreal). But I know damn well that I am anti-apartitde and damn well that I am against isreal's agressive tatics that create groups like hezbollah.

[Guest bengalrick]

[quote name='Coy Bacon' post='326015' date='Aug 29 2006, 04:09 PM']I don't understand for the life of me why the guy objects to being called a racist. If everything were as he seems to believe it is, he would be the first to proudly stand up and say, "HELL YES, I'M A RACIST!" if he had any hanging down things. I guess he's just confused.[/quote]

if i listened to you, i would be one biggoted muthafucka... for real!!

the difference between you and i, is you embrace racism while i fight against it (and yes, i'm talking about internally, not against people like you only)...

[Khatmandude]

[quote name='Jamie_B' post='326018' date='Aug 29 2006, 05:44 PM']You dont need to appologize, you and I share a number of things we do agree wholeheartly on (mostly social issues) this isnt one of them.

As far as the 2nd paragraph, that is one person, not everyone in here that is anti-zionist is saying that.

Hell I dont even know that I am anti-zionist (for the purpose of this defition I mean against the exisitance of isreal). But I know damn well that I am anti-apartitde and damn well that I am against isreal's agressive tatics that create groups like hezbollah.[/quote]

And I know damn well that you're anti-spell check

Anti-zionist = Anti jew, Martin Luther King says so.

[quote]if i listened to you, i would be one biggoted muthafucka... for real!!

the difference between you and i, is you embrace racism while i fight against it (and yes, i'm talking about internally, not against people like you only)...[/quote]

I have no idea who Coy is, and while it seems that he is abrasive towards some, I get the feeling from his posts that he cares about justice more than being friendly. This certainly is not a characteristic of a bigot.

[Jamie_B]

[quote name='IKOTA' post='326037' date='Aug 29 2006, 04:45 PM'][b]And I know damn well that you're anti-spell check [/b]

Anti-zionist = Anti jew, Martin Luther King says so.
I have no idea who Coy is, and while it seems that he is abrasive towards some, I get the feeling from his posts that he cares about justice more than being friendly. This certainly is not a characteristic of a bigot.[/quote]




It isnt working at the moment and Im too lazy to put it into MS word.

[Guest bengalrick]

[quote name='IKOTA' post='326037' date='Aug 29 2006, 04:45 PM']Anti-zionist = Anti jew, Martin Luther King says so.
I have no idea who Coy is, and while it seems that he is abrasive towards some, I get the feeling from his posts that he cares about justice more than being friendly. This certainly is not a characteristic of a bigot.[/quote]

i have proven he is time after time... he is "[url="http://www.google.com/search?num=100&hl=en&sa=X&oi=spell&resnum=0&ct=result&cd=1&q=define:+bigot&spell=1"]extremely intolerant of others and irrespective of reasoning[/url]." imo... he thinks i am too, so as i said, it is only my opinion... i don't think that coy hates me b/c i'm white, or b/c i'm a christian... only b/c he doesn't agree w/ my politics, and is unwilling to even comtemplate them...

love the joke about martin luther king btw... quality shit...

[Chris Henrys Dealer]

[url="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5295724.stm"]http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5295724.stm[/url]

[quote]Hezbollah's post-war strategy
By Roger Hardy
Middle East analyst, BBC News

Children remove a carpet from rubble in south Lebanon
Many homes have been destroyed in a month of fighting
A Lebanese opinion poll suggests the population is split down the middle over whether Hezbollah should be disarmed - one of the demands in the UN resolution which ended a month of fighting between it and Israel.

Two weeks into the ceasefire, what is Hezbollah's post-war strategy?

Hezbollah is savouring its triumph but also licking its wounds.

Virtually all commentators, including those most hostile to it, have acknowledged that the Lebanese movement has emerged from a month of fighting with its military and political prowess enhanced.

[b]But at the same time, its leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, seems well aware that Lebanon and the Lebanese paid a heavy price for its actions.

In a televised interview on Sunday, the Hezbollah leader came as close to an apology as he is likely to get.

"If I had known that the operation to capture the soldiers would lead to this result," he said, "we would not have carried it out."

It was Hezbollah's abduction of two Israeli soldiers in July which triggered the conflict.

The sheikh gave the interview to a privately-run Lebanese TV station rather than to Hezbollah's own station, al-Manar.

It was an obvious attempt to reach out to the wider Lebanese public.

His message of reassurance was that Hezbollah would not act recklessly to endanger the current ceasefire.



While the movement has won a new prestige on the Arab street, it cannot afford to alienate the different factions in Lebanon's complex communal balance.[/b]

A Lebanese soldier stands next to a Lebanese fla
The Lebanese army is reluctant to have to disarm Hezbollah

An opinion poll published on Monday suggests that half the country favours Hezbollah's disarmament - one of the demands made in the UN ceasefire resolution.

The poll, in a French-language Lebanese daily, found 51% in favour and 49% against.

Not surprisingly, an overwhelming majority of Shia - the bedrock of the movement's support - think it should keep its weapons.

But most Christians and Druze want it to disarm.

Hezbollah is confident that is not going to happen.

Neither the Lebanese army nor the UN multinational force which is currently being strengthened in the south want to take on the task.

Sheikh Nasrallah is not averse, however, to firing a symbolic shot across Kofi Annan's bows.

The UN secretary-general was jeered by Hezbollah supporters on Monday when he visited the ravaged southern suburbs of Beirut.

It looked like an orchestrated gesture of defiance, a none-too-subtle hint that a UN force might be tolerated but would not be welcomed.

Consolidation

But Hezbollah is nothing if not pragmatic.

It clearly wants the ceasefire to hold, at least for now, in order to consolidate its position.

To buttress support in its Shia constituency, it is spending tens of thousands of dollars helping rebuild homes and getting basic services up and running again.

At the same time it is signalling to all the Lebanese that it will think twice before provoking such devastation again.

It knows that the dominant mood is a profound war-weariness.[/quote]

[Guest Coy Bacon]

[quote name='bengalrick' post='326048' date='Aug 29 2006, 04:55 PM']i have proven he is time after time... he is "[url="http://www.google.com/search?num=100&hl=en&sa=X&oi=spell&resnum=0&ct=result&cd=1&q=define:+bigot&spell=1"]extremely intolerant of others and irrespective of reasoning[/url]." imo... he thinks i am too, so as i said, it is only my opinion... i don't think that coy hates me b/c i'm white, or b/c i'm a christian... only b/c he doesn't agree w/ my politics, and is unwilling to even comtemplate them...

love the joke about martin luther king btw... quality shit...[/quote]


Your politics have been long ago considered and long ago discredited, and the motivation behind such politics discerned. I can neither admit nor deny hating you, as I've said before, but I recognize that in your frenzied embrace of such politics, you are an enemy - perhaps an insignificant one, perhaps not - but it's a mistake to underestimate the potential impact of even the most insignificant enemy. A goose can bring down a jet liner.