|Elflocko| Posted June 11, 2010 Report Share Posted June 11, 2010 [quote name='Vol_Bengal' date='11 June 2010 - 05:03 AM' timestamp='1276257808' post='892657'] Hence... you have wars... when there is an attempt to "overrun" or inhabit a territory that is owned / possessed by another culture either the existing culture allows you to, the existing culture fights you for it, or you give up and quit. appears by responses here that [b]we're fine with "allowing them to".[/b].. to each his own, I guess. [/quote] There's a big difference between thinking that they're "A-OK" to be here illegally and believing that we're approaching the issue completely wrong... Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Vol_Bengal Posted June 11, 2010 Report Share Posted June 11, 2010 [quote name='Jamie_B' date='11 June 2010 - 11:33 AM' timestamp='1276270434' post='892685'] They arent at war with you vol. [/quote] No shit... we'd be the existing culture allowing them to... Or, in my sentence - the approach preferred amongst this group is option A. [quote name='Elflocko' date='11 June 2010 - 11:48 AM' timestamp='1276271332' post='892686'] There's a big difference between thinking that they're "A-OK" to be here illegally and believing that we're approaching the issue completely wrong... [/quote] kenneth openly admitted he was... A-OK with it. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Jamie_B Posted June 11, 2010 Author Report Share Posted June 11, 2010 I keep hearing this culture argument but what exactly is American culture? Because America in the south is very different than America in the west coast or east coast or north ect... Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Vol_Bengal Posted June 11, 2010 Report Share Posted June 11, 2010 [quote name='Jamie_B' date='11 June 2010 - 12:26 PM' timestamp='1276273618' post='892696'] I keep hearing this culture argument but what exactly is American culture? Because America in the south is very different than America in the west coast or east coast or north ect... [/quote] Ok... we'll not use "culture"... We're allowing these illegal immigrants to co-habitate alongside CITIZENS (legal) of the United States of America. Think society instead of culture. If that is honestly hanging you up... which I don't think is the case... I think we're arguing semantics at this point. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Squirrlnutz Posted June 11, 2010 Report Share Posted June 11, 2010 [quote name='Jamie_B' date='11 June 2010 - 12:26 PM' timestamp='1276273618' post='892696'] I keep hearing this culture argument but what exactly is American culture? Because America in the south is very different than America in the west coast or east coast or north ect... [/quote] Unfortunatley it looks something like this... [img]http://www.lamebook.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/sOILed2.png[/img] And these people are probably citizens... Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Vol_Bengal Posted June 11, 2010 Report Share Posted June 11, 2010 [quote name='Squirrlnutz' date='11 June 2010 - 01:15 PM' timestamp='1276276513' post='892703'] And these people are probably citizens... [/quote] what is worse... they have have right to vote... Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
BengalBacker Posted June 11, 2010 Report Share Posted June 11, 2010 [quote name='Jamie_B' date='10 June 2010 - 07:20 PM' timestamp='1276212056' post='892615'] [img]http://masbury.files.wordpress.com/2007/02/illegal-immigrants.jpg[/img] [img]http://young.anabaptistradicals.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/04/first_illegal_immigrants.jpg[/img] [img]http://mylifeasanalien.files.wordpress.com/2008/05/native-cartoon.jpg[/img] [img]http://cdn.crooksandliars.com/files/uploads/2007/08/native-americans-discuss-illegal-immigration.jpg[/img] [/quote] So what you're saying is, we should let them come in and take the country from us because that's what our forefathers did? Interesting. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Jamie_B Posted June 11, 2010 Author Report Share Posted June 11, 2010 [quote name='BengalBacker' date='11 June 2010 - 02:06 PM' timestamp='1276279595' post='892713'] So what you're saying is, we should let them come in and take the country from us because that's what our forefathers did? Interesting. [/quote] Not really, I just find some humorous irony in the situation thats all. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
sois Posted June 11, 2010 Report Share Posted June 11, 2010 [quote name='Vol_Bengal' date='11 June 2010 - 10:22 AM' timestamp='1276276958' post='892705'] what is worse... they have have right to vote... [/quote] Oil has electrolytes. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Squirrlnutz Posted June 11, 2010 Report Share Posted June 11, 2010 [quote name='sois' date='11 June 2010 - 02:17 PM' timestamp='1276280235' post='892715'] Oil has electrolytes. [/quote] Its what a body craves! Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
sois Posted June 11, 2010 Report Share Posted June 11, 2010 [quote name='Squirrlnutz' date='11 June 2010 - 11:20 AM' timestamp='1276280404' post='892717'] Its what a body craves! [/quote] That's hard science, even Jesus can admit that this is true. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Homer_Rice Posted June 12, 2010 Report Share Posted June 12, 2010 [img]http://i.imgur.com/syY1i.jpg[/img] Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Jamie_B Posted June 12, 2010 Author Report Share Posted June 12, 2010 That last comment on that pic is hilarious. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
|kennethmw| Posted June 12, 2010 Report Share Posted June 12, 2010 [quote name='Vol_Bengal' date='11 June 2010 - 12:17 PM' timestamp='1276273067' post='892694'] No shit... we'd be the existing culture allowing them to... Or, in my sentence - the approach preferred amongst this group is option A. [b]kenneth openly admitted he was... A-OK with it.[/b] [/quote] Vol, I never said I was "A-OK" with anything. What I have said, and continue to say, is that you cannot clean up the problem by attacking the reaction, you have to go after the problem. If your basement is flooding because you have a broken water spigot, you can mop the floor all you fucking want to, until you fix the spigot you still have the same flooded basement, and it ain't the fucking water's fault. This is what I don't think you see. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
|Bunghole| Posted June 12, 2010 Report Share Posted June 12, 2010 [img]http://i427.photobucket.com/albums/pp360/sgenetti77/metallica-kill-em-all-front.jpg[/img] Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
oldschooler Posted June 12, 2010 Report Share Posted June 12, 2010 [quote name='kennethmw' date='12 June 2010 - 08:37 AM' timestamp='1276349841' post='892776'] and it ain't the fucking water's fault. [/quote] Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
oldschooler Posted June 12, 2010 Report Share Posted June 12, 2010 [quote name='Jamie_B' date='10 June 2010 - 06:20 PM' timestamp='1276212056' post='892615'] [img]http://masbury.files.wordpress.com/2007/02/illegal-immigrants.jpg[/img] [img]http://young.anabaptistradicals.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/04/first_illegal_immigrants.jpg[/img] [img]http://mylifeasanalien.files.wordpress.com/2008/05/native-cartoon.jpg[/img] [img]http://cdn.crooksandliars.com/files/uploads/2007/08/native-americans-discuss-illegal-immigration.jpg[/img] [/quote] You know, there has to be a law against something for it to be illegal? Right? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Jamie_B Posted June 12, 2010 Author Report Share Posted June 12, 2010 [quote name='oldschooler' date='12 June 2010 - 05:05 PM' timestamp='1276376705' post='892798'] You know, there has to be a law against something for it to be illegal? Right? [/quote] Oh I know, we took the land and made that law. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
oldschooler Posted June 12, 2010 Report Share Posted June 12, 2010 [quote name='Jamie_B' date='12 June 2010 - 04:14 PM' timestamp='1276377250' post='892800'] Oh I know, we took the land and made that law. [/quote] In some cases it was sold to us even. But that wasn't the point. The Indians had no immigration laws. So it wasn't illegal. And those cartoons are dumb. Also, a lot of Countries were founded off of battles and taking of land. The U.S.A. is not exclusive in that regards. again. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Homer_Rice Posted June 12, 2010 Report Share Posted June 12, 2010 THE IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY IN THE LATE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY From Strength to Neutrality: Warfare, Diplomacy, and the Balance of Power between French and English Colonial Rivalries "They are indeed the fiercest and most formidable people in North America, and at the same time, are as politick and judicious, as well can be conceived; and this appears from the Management of all the Affairs which they transact, not only with the French and English, but likewise with almost all the Indian nations of this vast continent." Monsieur De La Poteriel "There is one custom their Men constantly observe ... That if they be sent with any message, though it demand the greatest dispatch, or though they bring intelligence of any imminent danger, they never tell it at their first approach; but sit down for a minute or two, at least, in Silence, to recollect themselves, before they speak, that they may not shew any Degree of Fear or Surprize, by an indecent Expression. Every sudden Repartee, in a publick Treaty, leaves them with an impression of a light inconsiderate mind; but, in private conversation, they use, and are delighted with brisk witty answers, as we can be. By this they shew the great Difference they place between the conversations of Man and Man, and of Nation and Nation; and in this, and a thousand other Things, might well be an example to the European Nations." Cadwallader Colden2 A Conceptual Framework What defines a nation? A good first approximation would be a reasonably coherent set of political instruments applicable to a given culture within a relatively contiguous geographical area. This description is useful but somewhat inadequate. For heuristic purposes, consider that a geometer's circumscription of a circle does not immediately reveal the area of that circle. However, the ratio between the diameter and the circumference yields the! number pi, which number is transcendental and is the means by which the area of a circle can be measured. This heurism is not as abstruse as it might seem. The Greeks are the first people we know of who believed that everything could be counted or measured. The Pythagoreans are known for their aphorisms: "Numbers are things. Things are numbers." This is an important component of the legacy which the Greeks passed on to Western civilization. The idea that anything and everything can be counted or measured has introduced axioms and forms into Western thought that go far beyond the realm of mathematics. The Greeks explored the boundaries of mathematical knowledge beyond rational numbers and irrational numbers up to what are called the transcendental numbers. In mathematics, transcendental numbers have two characteristics worth noting. First, a transcendental number is universal in the macrocosm. It is a proportion which remains constant. Pi, the example cited here, remains the same regardless of the size of the circle. Square any radius and multiply by pi and one has the area of a circle, irrespective of the circle's size. Second, in the microcosm, mathematical representation of the number pi contains an infinite number of decimals. This is the case with all transcendental numbers. Calculate as precisely as one might wish, to as many decimal points as one desires, a remainder always exists, making room for still further decimal points. Thus, transcendental numbers imply important epistemological and ontological considerations: they are simultaneously universal and infinitesimal, not only for our minds, but perhaps also in the fabric of the universe itself. In the macrocosm, One; in the microcosm, Many. Why is the definition of a nation, as given initially, inadequate? Given political instruments, culture, and a geographical area, we have enough to construct an entity that could fairly be described as a nation. Yet, the most fundamental insufficiency resides in what could be described as the transcendental character of a nation, which can be observed over time. The changes that accumulate over time, regardless of whether they can be considered fruitful or dangerous, lend considerable content to the character of a nation. The members of that nation, even if in disagreement over the policy choices made in the history of that nation, still identify the nation as their own. Institutions and social conventions of a nation change over time, as can geographical boundaries. Causes and effects in a nation are sometimes not so easily discerned, but nonetheless are present. A nation which changes over time is still that nation, and like an ecosystem, subtle and complex in its changes, is still a unity. Is there is a transcendental character which holds a nation together, referencing culture, political instruments, and geographical considerations, yet is somehow emergent from its predicates and not merely reducible to its constituents? Simple triangulation of culture, political instruments, and geographic boundaries cannot, in itself, "square the circle" and define a nation. Such a construction, or in the case of historiography, reconstruction, can at best only describe a nation. What can be elusive is consideration of a transcendental character, a "national pill which makes a nation what it is, over time and changing circumstances. One of the tasks of historiography is to faithfully inquire about the events which transpired within and between nations. Literally recording such events provides the most solid ground on which an historian can stand. Yet, such a literal transcription does not entirely satisfy the intellect, nor does it appease the curiosity which often impels the intellect. Most importantly, even thoroughly documented events are subject to various treatments by eminent historians; differing interpretations are a commonplace result of the analyses of historians who emphasize one set of variables over another, depending upon the focus of the investigation. A nation is universal to the extent that its ability to survive as a nation is reproduced. A nation transcends its members, its institutions, its geography. A nation is all of these things and something more. That "something more", its transcendental character, is the complex interaction of the elements of a nation which provide its unity and creates a macrocosm. A nation is likewise infinitesimal to the extent that it reproduces its ability to survive. Tn the microcosm, an infinite number of elements makes up the composition of the nation as a whole. Each individual component has its part: be it law, myth, convention, economic practice, living individual, dead ancestor, potential progeny, terrain, or any of the other innumerable aspects which combine to make up the whole. A nation, if it is to survive, cannot be frozen in stasis, for the interaction between the universal and the infinitesimal implies both constancy and multiplicity, and multiplicity implies change. The infinitesimal elements of a nation are the means by which a nation perpetuates itself. Through cause and effect, the many elements of a nation enhance or detract from the survivability of a nation. The relation between universal and particular is complex; it is not always susceptible to human apprehension. A nation is one and many, constant yet infinite, singular but also plural. An historian is cognizant of this and exercises caution. The Western impulse to count, to measure, has yielded knowledge more precise and more widespread than any other cultural force in history. This is a testament and a proof of the general methods associated with Western thought. Yet, lest those who adhere to such impulses arrogate a finality of truth to their specific method of gaining knowledge, the dialectic of transcendental numbers ought serve as a reminder to add caution to their potential hubris. An historian seeks the One among the Many, hoping to discover some predicates of the transcendental character of a nation chosen as subject; in turn, an historian's relative apprehension of a nation's transcendental character imposes an ordering principle which helps the historian select and emphasize those predicates which determined the fate of that nation. The trick of historiography is to ensure that an historian's grasp of both One and Many is consonant with, and faithful to, the events as they occurred. Thus, an historian records, and also measures, the area of the subject. Iroquois Historiography The tribes of Indians that we know collectively as the Iroquois called themselves "Ongwe-honwe"3, ,men surpassing all others", and described themselves as "Hodenosaunee"4, "a people dwelling in a long house." The word, Iroquois, is a French derivation of an Algonquin term meaning, variously, "rattlesnake" or "terrifying man'15. Admired and feared, sought after as an ally or attacked as an implacable enemy, the Iroquois League, composed of five tribes occupying the strategic headwaters of the Eastern Woodlands in North America, played a critical role in the early history of European involvement on this continent. These terrifying men, these men who in many ways did surpass all others, sometimes did act as if they had the attributes of a rattlesnake, striking their enemies quickly and with deadly force. Yet, the Five Nations were more than barbarous and uncivilized brutes. In the period during European entry onto North America, the Iroquois, in the words of their famous ethnographer, Lewis H. Morgan, "achieved for themselves a more remarkable civil organization, and acquired a higher degree of influence, than any other race of Indian lineage, except those of Mexico and Peru.116 The purpose of this paper is to examine the political institutions and diplomatic practices of the Iroquois, tracing the events of the latter half of the seventeenth century. It was during this time that European and Indian relations were establishing patterns for generations to come. During the early colonial period, particularly during the late seventeenth century, the Iroquois League held a prominent position as the preeminent tribal grouping in North America. The Iroquois were fierce warriors and able diplomats. Their quest for dominance required adept use of both skills. Iroquois war parties swept over the entire eastern woodlands, from the Carolinas in the south to the Illinois country in the west. But the Iroquois did not possess an empire in the sense that is associated with western usage of the term. There existed no bureaucracy based on property relations, just a shifting group of allies and tributary tribes which were bound together by kinship, actual or nominal. Their institutional structure was developed on this basis.7 During the second half of the seventeenth century the Iroquois Confederacy reached its zenith, was defeated in warfare, and yet regained much of its influence through diplomacy. Until the 17401s, when the Iroquois lost control of land in the Ohio country that had previously been ceded to the British, they held the balance of power between the French and the English. The turning point in the Iroquois transition from strength to neutrality came in the period between the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 and 1701, when the Iroquois negotiated treaties with both the French and the English. This paper will close with an examination of the treaties concluded in 1701, which treaties provided the fulcrum for an important transition in Iroquois power. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the major non-native powers on the North American continent were the French, the English, and the twelve colonies established by the English.8 Each of these powers had their own agendas and strategies for development on the continent, some of which will be referred to later. It is significant to mention that most, if not all of the agendas could not be implemented without some manner of interaction-with the native tribes. One of the problems in understanding Iroquois-European relations has to do with the seemingly ambivalent nature of European culture towards the native populations. An overall perspective of European actions tends to lend credence to the perception that there was no consistently principled basis for interaction with the tribes of North America. At times various European powers paid close heed to Indian relations, at others they seemed to virtually ignore previous agreements with the Indians. This can be perplexing, as well as somewhat condemning of European culture, if one does not delve a little deeper into the causes for this apparent lack of consistency. Francis Jennings, a noted scholar on the Iroquois, makes a useful contribution to clearing up this confusion in a discussion of the disparity between European ideological perspectives and the actual practice of Europeans on the scene in North America.9 He states that European ambivalence regarding treaty relations with tribal Indians stems from a general ideological perspective that more or less insisted that Indians did not have real governments, at least of the form that Europeans were accustomed to, which tended to be impersonal and bureaucratic. European ideology further implied that negotiation with Indians "flouted legal theories that assumed the sovereignty of European monarchs over the Indians; and in theory kings do not negotiate with subjects.1110 However, European agents on the scene recognized some important practical considerations that could not be reconciled through recourse to ideology. Negotiations with Indians, and particularly the Iroquois, were necessary because the European presence in North America was not powerful enough to dictate policy to the Indians. Also, agents better understood the kin relationships that organized tribal groupings, and knew them to represent actual governments that functioned and had control over policies related to trade, war, and the distribution of land. Hence, treaties were negotiated in order to channel these Indian governmental powers into useful consonance with European goals.11 The insight offered by Jennings opens a window through which one can better view the occasionally contradictory patterns established by Europeans in their relations with Indians. Instead of accepting a vulgar and popular view which sees the Indians as quaint savages, and the Europeans as duplicitous connivers, perhaps one ought consider more precisely specific relations between the two cultures and their underlying motivations. The most focused intersection of European and native cultures occurred when the two sides met to formally discuss policy or practice, and to reach agreement or express disagreement. As Jennings says, it is important to understand the function of treaties and how this institution worked, or "otherwise we might all be back at the stage of admiring the eloquence and drama displayed in their records without really understanding what was really going on.1112 Wilcomb Washburn concurs. "In recent years the mythical view of the Iroquois has given way to more careful analysis of the original data on which the nineteenth century image [of the League] rested. One of the results of that study has been a more perceptive understanding of the sophistication of Iroquois diplomacy.1113 This more detailed look at Iroquois diplomacy reveals some very interesting facts that can lay to rest the vulgar view. The government of Indian tribes was efficient in many ways even though it did not have the appearance some Europeans might assume, and the protocol of "treaty proceedings were conducted according to Iroquois ritual and in the phrasing of Iroquois metaphor.1114 The meanings of these rituals and metaphors were precise. Although our understanding of some of them are now somewhat clouded by the passage of time and the lack of perfect records, there are sufficient examples to indicate this was true. Iroquois society was based on kin relationships, and thus the squabbles about appropriate terms of address, such as "brother" or "father" were significant, at least to the Iroquois and to perceptive Europeans.15 Ritualistic actions, such as passing wampum, had precise meanings, too. If, in discussion, no wampum was passed, then the talk was merely that, simple talk. if, however, wampum was passed during key portions of a dialogue, it signified a deeper meaning, and was in fact a diplomatic proposal of serious import. Whether the wampum was accepted or not was important as well, for if the wampum was accepted, it meant that the proposal would be given serious consideration; if the wampum was not accepted, or allowed to fall to the ground, it meant that the proposal was flatly rejected.16 These ritualistic actions, as well as the oratory accompanying them, often meant the difference between peace or war, and were not taken lightly by the Iroquois or by perceptive Europeans who understood their import. In general, Europeans tended to view Indians as uncivilized barbarians. Superficially, evidence supporting this perception seemed abundant. Even the powerful Iroquois were economically and technologically less sophisticated than European culture. Iroquois social structure appeared to be less developed than European culture and this colored European perceptions of the Iroquois. Many Europeans knew that the Indians had no written language, yet, how many knew that the Iroquois painted trees describing exploits that had occurred in battle or on hunts, thus passing from generation to generation a crude written record?17 The different culture and social structure of the Iroquois does not necessarily imply that Iroquois culture did not have its own intricacies. To reiterate one example, "Europeans never appreciated the widespread network of kinship that encompassed the Eastern Woodlands, and they misunderstood the values that Indians gave to the terms, 'brothers', 'cousins', 'uncles/nephews', 'fathers/sons,! assigning these terms the meanings conventional in Europe.1118 The role these terms played in diplomatic protocol was significant and shaped the Iroquois view of their various alliances and treaties. Iroquois diplomacy was as complex as the political organization of the Five Nations. An article by William N. Fenton supports this claim. He examined the founding of the Confederacy, he analyzed the Condolence ritual, he studied the "supporting props" of diplomacy such as the use of wampum strings and mnemonic devices, concluding that the form of treaty negotiations was as important as the content-19 The content of treaty negotiations tended to be tactical, and thus more easily understood by European negotiators. Military alliances, trade agreements, settling land disputes or rights of passage, all these were of practical importance to both parties. In a way, they were fairly straightforward issues to be resolved in a mutually satisfactory, or sometimes less than mutually satisfactory manner. The form that these negotiations took often tended to bewilder those Europeans who did not have an acute understanding of native culture. Those Europeans who assumed that the Iroquois had no well-developed political structure, simply on the basis that it did not have a similar appearance to the bureaucratic structure of European political organization, did not lend great weight to the diplomatic protocol of the Iroquois. Hence, in the eyes of some Europeans, diplomatic protocol was reduced to mystical mumbo-jumbo because they could not conceive the character of the Iroquois nation. Fortunately for those across the Atlantic who did not understand the complexities of dealing with the native peoples, there were many on the scene in North America who did come to understand and admire the sophistication of Iroquois culture. These individuals undertook the tasks of treating with the native populations as intermediaries, translators, and negotiators. Sometimes their authority was limited and their roles were subservient to the authority of those who did not understand the Iroquois as well. In some cases, these individuals gained positions of authority and thus were able to meliorate potential conflict between two alien cultures.20 Thus, what appears to be ambivalence on the part of European culture as a whole towards the native peoples of North America is perhaps better understood as a question of knowledge and authority. When those who understood native culture also had the authority to influence and implement policy, diplomatic relations were treated with gravity and rectitude. Those Europeans and colonists who had authority, but less understanding, sometimes took native protocol as a means to gain an end, thus demeaning political negotiations to quaint ritual. When circumstances later changed, as they often did, ignoring the obligations of their participation in a mere "ceremony" came easily. Recent scholarship on the Iroquois has delved deeply into the infinitesimal elements of Iroquois unity. Two points already noted bear repetition. First, the European powers and their colonial agencies were forced to treat with the Iroquois as an equal power during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Second, Iroquois diplomacy was much more than ceremonial ritual; its protocol was intricate and its content was binding. Among the implications of these two conclusions is this notable consideration, that the five tribes were in fact Five Nations, as the Iroquois were often described. Furthermore, these Five Nations were in a very important way, one nation, a singular unity with a transcendental character, that character being an emergent quality from innumerable sets of predicates and elements which composed not only the individual constituent tribes of the Iroquois League, but also those sets of elements which determined interaction between the tribes within the League. The thoughts of Daniel Richter, a scholar of the Iroquois, regarding the events of 1701, can now be more easily understood, within the context of the foregoing discussion. It is his view that the agreements of what is known as "the Grand Settlement of 170111 were more a "French diktatlthan a bold stroke of native diplomacy" and that the purported unity of the Iroquois League "was riven be localistic tendencies, factional disputes, and ethnic rivalries.1121 Richter expresses the thought that the Iroquois were not in possession of an empire, but rather that the Iroquois maintained a complex series of alliances.22 Richter's conclusions represent the fruit of recent scholarship. His efforts, and the efforts of others, provide advances over earlier treatises, such as that of S.C. Kimm.23 Recent scholarship also clarifies some of the seminal work of individuals such as Colden24 25 26 Morgan , and Parker . However, Richter, in drawing a useful distinction between empire and alliance, seems to diminish the achievements of the Iroquois at the turn of the eighteenth century, though perhaps this is not his intent. It could be suggested that these diplomatic achievements were all the more spectacular given what we now known about the complex alliances and factional tendencies of the Iroquois. Richter does not place great emphasis on his implied diminution of Iroquois power, but he does raise an interesting question. Is it realistic to suggest that any society, culture, or government might be free from internal disputes? Unity is not conformity in lockstep, nor is active and well-conceived diplomacy only undertaken from a position of strength. It is certain that the Iroquois adapted quite well under the circumstances and while the evidence cited by Richter and others is true, it is also true that the Iroquois maintained their unity under difficult conditions. The diplomacy engaged in by the Iroquois at the turn of the eighteenth century was subtle and clever, and is typified by the activity of a man who ought be considered a hero by his culture, Teganissorens. Rather than succumbing to the centrifugal forces of pro-French and pro-British factions, Teganissorens and his adherents not only mollified both factions but melded the interests of these factions into an overriding, subsuming interest in the unity of the Iroquois. The issue which Richter and others corrects is this. Early admirers of the Iroquois tended to mythologize that culture, granting it the status of empire. The first ethnographers of the Iroquois, such as Morgan, Parker, and lesser lights such as Kimm, tended to conceive of the Iroquois as a cultural repository of static and unchanged rituals and practices. William Fenton comments on the controversy surrounding Parker's codification of the Iroquois constitution, citing evidence that suggests that Parker inadvertently mixed elements of different periods in Iroquois culture.27 Known as the "Great Binding Law" or as the "Great Immutable Law..28, Parker wrote down what had previously been transmitted orally with mnemonic aids such as wampum belts and strings. Unfortunately, Parker relied on conservative tribal sachems who tended to ignore the influence of other aspects of Iroquois history.29 Richter buttresses this position of recent scholars, claiming that Morgan and Parker need to be corrected; Iroquois culture was not a static "ethnographic present" codified into eternal values. Instead, historiography reveals that internal Iroquois political history shows that the Iroquois "devised novel solutions within a framework of familiar cultural patterns-1130 Does Richter diminish the significance of Iroquois unity by helping to expel the myth of Iroquoian empire and supplant it with Iroquoian diplomacy? Perhaps not, for he claims that Iroquois "innovation within the terms of cultural conservatism... provides one key to the Five Nations' survival and to the Iroquois' prominent role in the diplomacy of eastern North America.1131 Dispelling the myth of empire corrected an imbalance that earlier commentators implied; Iroquois culture was romanticized through good intention. European ideology, including now American ideology, measured Iroquois culture with an imperfect yardstick. The myth of empire was an imposition of western measure that benignly assessed Iroquois culture, yet was distanced from the truth. Recent scholarship has come a long way to rectify these earlier misperceptions. Yet, a similar caution should be sounded; our western tendency to measure must continually refine its instruments of measure. Iroquois diplomacy has been discovered to be just as intricate, and just as fractious, as European diplomacy of the same time. The forms were different because of the difference in culture, but the practical results were similar. It is recognized that the object of policy properly reflects the will of those putting forth the policy. In the case where competing factions exist, generally the most adept and powerful faction's polic y is the one put into place. It is taken for granted that western politics is competitive, yet, care must be taken not to suggest that the same competitiveness in other cultures, in this case the Iroquois, is a sign of weakness. Richter exemplifies this caution. French diktat or not, the important feature of Iroquois diplomacy in 1701 is its brilliance and success. The dipl-omacy of Teganissorens is as significant to Iroquois culture as was the diplomacy of Benjamin Franklin during the American Revolution. The survival of a nation was at stake in each instance. The Continentals were not in a position of strength, nor was the outcome of their struggle certain. Can we praise the one and not the other? Historical Setting The final sputtering gasps of the medieval Crusades came to an inglorious halt in the sixteenth century. In 1523 Rhodes fell into control of the Ottoman Turks. In 1526 Suleiman the Magnificent, Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, destroyed the Hungarian army at Mohacs, leaving 24,000 dead. This secured a rising and powerful Ottoman influence in Europe for the next two centuries. In 1570,Cyprus likewise came under control of the Ottomans. After this setback, Pope Pius V sought to reunify the western Christian kingdoms in a Holy League dedicated to the overthrow of the Ottomans. Unity around this goal did not come easily, for suspicions among the western powers created conflicts which did not allow for coordinated, multilateral actions. Though the primary impulse of the medieval Crusades was to prevent eastern Christianity from being dominated by Moslem rule and to preserve rights of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, profitable trade with the Levant and other far eastern lands came to be equally significant during the centuries.of rule by the Frankish kingdoms in the Levant. The ultimate failure of the Crusades, the defeat of the few remaining Christian kingdoms in the Near East, and the rise of the Ottoman Turks hampered the goals of the kingdoms of western Europe, diminishing their influence in the Levant. Centuries of exposure to the wealth of the East created a dependency and a desire for a maintenance of trade with the Levant and the Orient. The lure of lucrative trade, restricted, though not entirely cut off, by changing circumstances in the eastern Mediterranean, forced the western kingdoms to consider alternate routes to the East. As various western loci of power grew in wealth and stature, competition between them became more fierce. Longstanding rivalries, such as that between England and France, carried those conflicts far and wide. While Portugal and Spain competed globally and carved empires in South America, France and England sought the elusive "Northwest Passage" to the Orient. The Age of Exploration, in part motivated by the need to maintain trade with the East that was partially blocked by Ottoman strength, also became, in some places, an age of conflict by proxy. This can be observed in North America during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, as Ottoman strength began to wane, as Muscovite strength began to emerge, the balance of power in Europe was threatened. While diplomats from England and France sought concessions and influence on the primary "front" at the Porte in Istanbul, an important secondary "front" in North America simmered in conflict. Tentative explorations in North America by Cabot and Cartier in the early sixteenth century accelerated over the next hundred years. The French, the Dutch, and the English set up trading posts and by the early d ecades of the seventeenth century the eastern woodlands of North America became a strategic goal in itself. Where England and France had sought alternate routes to the East Indies and the Orient, they instead found a land with economic potential of its own. The eastern woodlands proved to be a bountiful region containing a mild climate, sufficient rainfall for agriculture, plenty of fresh water both flowing and standing, extensive forests with many potential resources, and an abundance of game within the forests.32 The French, Dutch, and English realized the rich economic potential of the region and sought ways to profit from its vast resources. The trading partners of the European explorers were the indigenous peoples of the eastern woodlands. Furs were the primary commodity Europeans sought and in exchange they introduced metal implements, textiles and firearms to these tribes. The French, under the leadership of Samuel de Champlain, established trade relations along the New England coast and down the St. Lawrence River. The English began a presence along the New England coast in the early decades of the seventeenth century, establishing settlements and trading with various tribes. The Dutch established a post at Albany in 1624 and purchased Manhattan in 1626, founding New Amsterdam.33 By the end of the seventeenth century the French and English had competing trade empires on North America. French influence extended in an "inland arc from Quebec to New Orleans, by way of the St. Lawrence, the Great Lakes, the Wabash River, the Illinois River, and the Mississippi.,,34 The English had taken over Dutch holdings in the 16701s; New Amsterdam thus became New York. The English had extensive influence along the Atlantic seaboard, as well as up the Hudson, Delaware, Susquehanna, and Potomac rivers.35 The Europeans, in the course of establishing a presence on the continent, started with scattered trading outposts and eventually began to create permanent settlements that developed activities beyond the range of normal trading practices. The establishment of relations with native tribes also expanded beyond trade agreements to include negotiations concerning land cessions or purchases, security arrangements, and other purposes, including "the power to be acquired by their manpower.1136 The deepening of relations between Europeans and native tribes drew the participants into more complex diplomacy. The French and British sought to use allied tribes as proxies in the machinations of their rivalry. Furthermore, the Europeans were drawn into the rivalries already existing among various tribes. The French, obliged to listen to their Huron and Algonquin trading partners and allies, were persuaded to take an inimical stance against the Iroquois who were their enemies. In turn, Iroquois tribes predicated their Covenant Chain with the English on the idea of a common bond of kinship. This is exemplified by the comments of an Iroquois faction leader, Sadeganktie, who in 1694 reminded Governor Fletcher of New York of the importance of "Keeping [the] chain firm and inviolable [and] all that are linked therein ... The least Member cannot be touched, but the whole body must feel and be sensible; if therefore an Enemy hurt the least part of the Covenant Chain, we will join to destroy that Enemy, for we are one Head, one Flesh, and one Blood.1137 These arrangements between allies were not necessarily fully reciprocal. The French, as well as the British, had goals of their own which did not necessarily coincide with the interests of their respective Indian allies. Likewise, native tribes, especially the Iroquois, acted in their own interest and not solely at the behest of their European allies. Hence, diplomacy between Europeans and native tribes had many faces. The search for common purpose and mutual agreement occurred in a context which presumed specific, individual advantages for rival negotiating powers. Rivalries, between and among all the important powers in the eastern woodlands, not only shaped strategy for these powers, but also shaped the content of diplomacy which served as the basis for concerted actions between rivals, or as the means by which conflict was resolved between the powers. The Iroquois Confederacy was situated on territory between the English settlements on the Atlantic seaboard and the French trading empire to the north and northwest. This is the area known as upstate New York today. In addition, the Iroquois claimed territory that was disputed between the French and English: the "Ohio country." The Iroquois claim was based on hunting rights, conquest, and the fact that other tribes in the area were politically dependent on the Confederacy.38 Iroquois settlements were located in a favorable geographic position. Lake Ontario to the north and the Allegheny mountain range to the southwest provided defensive boundaries. More important, for the basis of Iroquois power stemmed from their ability to travel far with speed, Iroquois territory included the headwaters of five significant waterways that spread in all directions: the Hudson, Delaware, Ohio, Susquehanna, and St. Lawrence rivers. The Iroquois were "not insensible to the political advantages afforded by their geographical position. It was their boast that they occupied the highest part of the continent.1139 The French and British recognized that the Iroquois had ready access to their respective territories via these waterways. Furthermore, both the French and British recognized Iroquois claims to the Ohio territory.40 Iroquois influence over other tribes, sometimes by conquest, 41 sometimes by persuasion behind a common policy , made them a formidable, sovereign power. As a result, the Iroquois were drawn into and actively participated in the struggles between the French and the English.42 The English used the Iroquois as a barrier between their territories and Canada, preventing raids by Canadian Indians. Yet, the British eventually developed a partnership with the Iroquois to penetrate French trading alliances over the Great Lakes and Mississippi Valley regions.43 The French viewed the Iroquois alternately as a threat to peace and a positive force blocking the access of Canada's Indians from English markets, the which tended to offer better trade goods.44 The Iroquois were in constant contact with both French and English colonies. Although trade relations were the focal point of most diplomatic efforts, treaty relations varied from "nonbelligerence to a full alliance for military aid.1145 The Iroquois had objectives of their own that went beyond trade arrangements. Their interest was the dominance over other Indian peoples. To help attain this objective, the Iroquois often engaged in active diplomacy using the Ohio country "as a fulcrum in a game of playing off one side against the other that kept both the French and the British perennially off balance.1146 The Evolution of Iroquois Institutions "Originally the Five Nations of Iroquois were similar to other Indian tribes or bands--independent bodies with similar dialects and similar customs but with no political coherence.1147 Fenton goes on to describe the development of Iroquois institutions as a response to internal warring and external pressures which in turn led to the "development of their strategic abilities and fostered diplomacy. it likewise produced leaders and finally the great lawgiver who [brought] about peace and unity.1148 These events have been passed on in Iroquois mythology and are known as the Dekanawida Legend or the establishment of the "Great Peace". Parker's codification of the "constitution" of the Iroquois shows how elaborate the social and political relations of the Iroquois became. Among other elements, it discusses the distinctions between the tribes; the rights, duties, and qualifications of sachems; duties and rights of war chiefs; discusses clans and bloodlines; delineates the laws pertaining to adoption and emigration; explains the rights of foreign nations; as well as the powers of war.49 Naturally, these developments in Iroquois social structure did not occur all at once. They are a result of a slow accumulation of adaptations and modifications of both hunter and agricultural forms of social organization. These two forms of organization tend to be antithetical; a hunting culture tends to be more primitive with occasional tribal subdivision by bands splitting off for new hunting grounds, while an agricultural form tends to be more stationary due to the requirements of cultivation and harvest.50 Iroquois culture developed solutions to the potentially centrifugal aspects of these forms. Perhaps the startling combinations of barbarity in war and civility in diplomacy can be traced back to this mixture. Lewis H. Morgan gives a lengthy description of the ethnology of the Iroquois.51 Essentially, he describes the development of tribes, villages, and nations, showing the complexity of Iroquois social structure. Family relationships, traceable through a matrilineal mode for purposes of heredity, formed its basis. These clans were found in all tribes creating a bond of unity among them. The development of permanent villages, in combination with this network of clans, led to the development of distinct nations, and formed the fundamental units of Iroquois political life.52 Sara Stites argues that this formation of clans and tribes arose from economic conditions and developed for the purpose of creating better economic prosperity; she further argues that the Confederation and the League were extensions of this organization.53 The roles of men and women were dividied within Iroquois social and political structure along the lines of hunter and agricultural forms. Men hunted, engaged in warfare, and carried out diplomacy. Cadwallader Colden described the role of men as very similar to that of Lacedaemon, saying that " ... the Five Nations, in many respects, resembles ... their [Sparta's] Laws, or Customs, being, in both, form'd to render the Minds and Bodies of the People fit for War.1154 Women supervised agricultural activities and watched over affairs around the villages. The role of sachem was hereditary, and women nominated replacements. Warriors confirmed nominations. Behind the scenes women lobbied for policies with spokesmen regarding local policy. Furthermore, women were entitled to publicly demand revenge or replacement through capture and adoption the loss of a murdered relative. This in effect was the power to pronounce war and has given rise to the term historians use: mourning wars.55 While many of the positions of power within Iroquois society were hereditary, there was also a component of merit based influence within the political structure.56 Esteem was granted to those who were powerful orators and to those who led exemplary lives. There was no material profit to be gained from leadership and often turned out to be a material 57 loss for those in positions of leadership . This brings to light an important distinction between the role of village headmen and the hereditary sachem. Whereas the sachem often had a ceremonial role in Iroquois society, the village headmen were often the ones who got things accomplished. As Richter points out, fulfilling the traditional duties of a sachem required the virtues of restraint and passivity, qualities that can easily be inimicable to political leadership-58 These two classes of leaders, sachems and chiefs, played important, but different, roles within Iroquois society. Iroquois success in mixing and adapting to hunter and agricultural forms of social structure led to a complex degree of unity in their political organization.59 This is remarkable especially when one considers the role that revenge played within Iroquois culture. Colden, who was sympathetic to Iroquois culture but never lost his Eurocentric outlook, claimed that revenge was a strong motive in Iroquois life and that they would be more civilized if they could curb their desire for revenge.60 In fact, the Iroquois did curb this desire to a large extent, at least among themselves. Anthony F.C. Wallace describes the importance of "The Great Peace" which founded the Iroquois League, saying that the "minimum purpose of the League was to maintain unity, strength, and good will among the Five Nations, so as to make them invulnerable to attack from without and to division from within."61 The Great Peace was founded to prevent internecine warfare and blood feuds, yet, wars against external enemies were often based on the motive for revenge.62 Eventually, as Wallace states, "to be a Seneca was to be a member of one of the most feared, most courted, and most respected tribes in North America.1,63 Kimm, during his treatment of the origin legend, describes the formation of the League as a political reform, a way to live with one another, and cites the attributes of the tribes.64 The Mohawks were great warriors. The Oneidas offered wise counsel. The Onondagas were "gifted in speech and mighty in war." The Cayugas displayed "superior cunning in hunting.,, The Senecas had agricultural talents. These descriptions imply a mixture of potential barbarity and civility and also imply that the formation of the League wrought unity out of circumstances in which continued fragmentation could have prevailed. The political organization of the Iroquois was split into three levels: village, tribal nation, and League/Confederacy. Each was important and had its place within Iroquois society. Each community defended its local ways and one means by which the League maintained its unity was by allowing local autonomy.65 Village headmen and local orators had their bases of power within the village, and not in the tribal nation or the Confederacy as a whole.66 The tribal nation had councils which determined war and peace, disposition of lands, and other external policies. Decisions taken at the tribal level were dependent upon individual villages and their willingness to implement those decisions.67 In matters of war, often tribal nations acted independently. At times, nations within the League acted contradictorily in warfare. On other occasions the League combined its might against a common foe.68 A degree of autonomy among the nations was thus the case as well. The League held Grand Councils at Onondaga and the Onondagas were the "firekeepers". At such Counsels a certain protocol of ceremony was maintained. Words of condolence were offered, wampum was exchanged, the Mohawks and Senecas held precedence as Elder Brothers.69 The interplay among the three types of political organization often came to light at these Grand Councils. The ceremonies undertaken at Grand Councils were done by the hereditary sachems, but often the merit-based leaders, the village headmen and orators were part of deliberations on policy. Villages were allowed to send many delegations to a Council, yet each nation was limited to a single vote.70 Sometimes tribes were split into factions. For example, the Seneca in the east were generally pro-British while the Geneseo Seneca in the West were pro-French.71 Grand Councils were sometimes the scene for hashing out tribal consensus. Colden describes the League as a confederacy of independent republics72 and Kimm called it a 73 representative democracy What is clearly the case, no matter how one describes Iroquois political structure, is that the complexity of Iroquois politics accommodated a lot of potentially divergent "power" bases and provided a means of unity that surpassed other tribes in North America. This, in itself, is a remarkable development, especially when considering that this social and political structure developed in relative isolation, without example from other cultures. By the middle of the seventeenth century some further developments had occurred. The "Great Peace" was largely ceremonial originally and Grand Councils were often reaffirmations of the creation of Iroquois unity. Daniel Richter, referring to the changes forced upon the Iroquois as they came into contact with Europeans, says that "however halting [these changes brought about] in terms of Confederacy unity, the diplomatic and political developments of the mid-seventeenth century nonetheless established important patterns.1174 He distinguishes between the League and the Confederacy in the following way. The League represented the hereditary and ceremonial aspect of Iroquois culture; the Confederacy was in flux and grew out of contact with the Europeans. In the Confederacy the merit-based leaders became more prominent. New leaders stayed within ancient ceremonial patterns and their roles grew out of local issues which took on greater prominence as European contact spread. Fenton notes that with European contact the material culture of the Iroquois changed but that "the social organization and political institutions remained relatively unaffected.,,75 He further claimed that "Iroquois political organization extends the basic patterns of social structure and local organization to a wider context. This concept is important for understanding their view of alliances and treaties because they included colonial governments in the network of symbolic kinship by such devices as the 'Chain' ... 1176 To summarize, Iroquois institutions developed out of a need to create coherence among forms of social economy and organization, and also from the desire to stop blood feuds within their own culture. The political coherence that did develop helped prepare them for the strategic challenge brought about by the Europeans. Furthermore, the Iroquois began to pattern their interaction with the Europeans on a familiar basis and diplomacy with the Europeans grew out of the forms on which they based their own society. From Strength to Neutrality The Iroquois were successful in their seventeenth century wars for several reasons. Their geographic position was strategically well-placed, the League provided internal peace and minimized intra-League conflict, their cultural matrix valued glory in warfare, and an economic motive existed for expansion--gaining control of hunting grounds for the furs to be used in trade.77 Iroquois men were trained to be warriors and they gained notoriety as warriors and were able to cause terror in other tribes, thereby gaining a psychological advantage in warfare.78 Iroquois expansion grew out of the Mourning wars of the sixteenth century. Mourning wars originally were blood feuds in which revenge was demanded for the loss of tribal members. The scope of these feuds expanded when, during the course of these raids, trade goods were seized from enemy bands.79 The economic motives for warfare increased as contact with Europeans grew. In return for furs, especially beaver which up until the time of European contact had not been too highly valued as game8o, the Iroquois could obtain firearms and other implements. The Iroquois were usually better armed than their enemies because they had access to a choice of French, Dutch, or English markets while other tribes did not have the same advantage and were usually limited to trade with the French.81 This proved to be the case when the Iroquois warred on the Eries and the Neutrals in the early and mid seventeenth century.82 There were also demographic reasons for expansion through warfare. One aspect of the blood feuds grew to greater significance as the social and political structure of the Iroquois became more complex. Women, when they demanded revenge for the capture or murder of a loved one, could insist that an enemy be captured to replace the loved one in their family. This trait developed into an Iroquois policy of adopting conquered tribes into their own, not as slaves but actually integrating them into Iroquois life-83 The extension of kinship to conquered enemies is another example of the pattern of Iroquois social structure which differed from the Europeans. Also, this practice provided a means by which the population of Iroquoia could be increased. But the fur trade proved to be the primary motive for Iroquois expansion in the seventeenth century. As supplies of beaver diminished in the general area around Iroquoia, the Iroquois began looking to the north and west for new hunting grounds. In the course of attempting to secure additional supplies the Iroquois came into more conflict with the Algonquin and Huron tribes which also depended upon the fur trade for survival. The French had allied with these tribes and in 1615 participated with the Hurons and Algonquins in a raid against the Iroquois. The Iroquois were supplied by the Dutch at Fort Orange and rivalry over the fur trade continued for the next thirty five years. In 1649 the Iroquois launched a massive assault against the already disease-weakened Hurons. The destruction of Huronia, helped by Iroquois raids, left the French in a precarious position. Raid and counterraid continued for the next dozen years and by the early 1660's the French trade empire was in trouble, blocked by Iroquois control of a major portion of the source of furs.84 By the middle of the 1660's the Iroquois were the dominant force from "Iroquoia in the east, to the lands north and south of Lake Michigan in the west ... bounded by the Ohio River valley in the south and the Ottawa River in the north.1185 The Iroquois had essentially cleared the area of rival tribes and held control of the rich beaver trade. It was during this period that the Iroquois Confederacy political structure grew; it was also during this period that the Iroquois adapted the ceremonial practices of the Great Peace to diplomacy with the Europeans.86 The Iroquois were at the height of their power but were still threatened by some powerful enemies. To the south the Susquehannocks were an equally well-armed and powerful tribe which threatened to impinge on Iroquois fur trade; to the east the Mahicans were also a powerful tribe. The French, realizing the threat to their western trade empire, began to become more active in their opposition to the Iroquois.87 The French had sent over the Carignan-Salieres Regiment and invaded and burned several Mohawk villages. In response to these challenges, Iroquois village headmen and orators began to meet and discuss solutions to these problems. One village leader, Garakontie, became prominent throughout the League as an orator.88 The notable feature of this development in Iroquois political history has been mentioned: these meetings of village headmen took place within the context of Iroquois ceremonial practices, yet they were an innovation in response to the new challenges of the period. The Jesuits documented a meeting that occurred in this period which took place at a Grand Council, but was in a separate forum from the council. Village headmen gathered and discussed common problems and concerns.89 The English helped the Iroquois negotiate a settlement with the Mahicans9o and in 1667 the Iroquois negotiated a treaty with the French.91 The Iroquois secured their flanks to the east and west and concentrated on confronting the threat posed by the Susquehannocks. This conflict also originated in the blood feuds of earlier times and the next ten years were a bloody and protracted period of warfare. The war ended mysteriously, perhaps helped by frontiersmen of Maryland and Virginia, and the Iroquois defeated the Susquehannocks.92 Two notable changes occurred during this period. First, relative calm in the west allowed the French and their Indian allies to slowly slip back into the Ohio country and reoccupy some of the rich game lands. Iroquois focus on their war with the Susquehannocks allowed this to happen.93 Second, Iroquois relations with the British began in this period as the Dutch lost control of their colony to the English. The English and the Iroquois became close trading partners, especially after 1677.94 h their.- n t FT-- ~Stco * _0 y to e glish. The and the am *se A series of treaties between the Iroquois and the English in 1677 resulted in the Covenant Chain. The "Silver" Covenant Chain involved more than the "Iron" Covenant Chain between the Iroquois and the Dutch; whereas 96 the latter was primarily a trading alliance , the former "functioned primarily as an aggressive partnership of the Five Nations and New York to penetrate the French trading and alliance systems that spread over the Great Lakes and Mississippi Valley regions.1197 Between 1677 and 1690 relations between the English and the Iroquois deepened; all this while the Iroquois were in conflict with the French, either in open warfare or in tentative discussions with the French to resolve this warfare. Thus, the Iroquois were firmly established as one leg of a triad of powerful nations trying to wrest an advantage in the northeast. The nature of the partnership between the Iroquois and the English was interpreted differently by the two nations. From an Iroquois perspective, alliances required regular renewal and thus there were many meetings between the Iroquois and the English to "brighten the Chain.1198 Yet, the English tended to see the relationship differently than the Iroquois. Richard Haan describes the differences and suggests that the Iroquois did not have the same point of view as did the English.99 Instead of an "institution for sharing power with the Iroquois over other indigenous peoples of the Eastern woodlands, or as a process by which the English eventually imposed sovereignty upon the Five Nations," the Iroquois "acted upon their own historical and q~u n 0 a t 0 y to e ~gli~sh The~ . 29 cultural expectations.11100 Haan thus argues that the Iroquois saw the relationship with the English as a series of distinct chains, which implies that the question of sovereignty was not fully settled. The English tended to think that they were more-than-equal partners over the Iroquois while the Iroquois stridently maintained their own sovereignty. In 1686, Governor Dungan of New York told the Iroquois that the King of England adopted them as "children and subjects." This resulted from a 1684 treaty in which the Iroquois ambiguously declared that they were subjects of the crown but also maintained the right to ally themselves as they chose.101 Subsequent to the settlement of the war with the Susquehannocks, the Iroquois found it necessary to reassert their claims in the Ohio country. In the 1680's the Iroquois attacked the Illinois and Miamis. Encouraged by the English, who saw this as a means to damage French interests, the Iroquois saw this as a matter of economic importance. The "Beaver Wars", as they are sometimes described, began with Iroquois successes and by 1687, the French were compelled to intervene. Governor de Nonville sent troops into Seneca homelands in June and destroyed four villages.102 In retaliation, 1500 Iroquois warriors attacked Lachine, just 6 miles upstream from Montreal, in July of 1689, massacring all the residents.103 This set the pattern for escalation of an already longstanding conflict and over the next next ten years the French and Iroquois were constantly at war. In 1689, war between France and England started. Known as the War of the League of Augsburg in Europe, it became known as King William's War in North America. Leiser's Rebellion in New York also occurred in 1689, thus making English support of the Iroquois during this period less helpful. In 1689, the French returned Governor Frontenac to Montreal to lead the war effort and by 1695 the Iroquois were on the defensive. The French had regained control of the eastern part of Lake Ontario and established Fort Cataraqui, where they could invade Iroquoia at will.104 In 1697, the Treaty of Ryswick ended French and English hostilities, but the French refused to make peace with the Iroquois. The French thus treated the Iroquois as sovereign from the English and they and their Indian allies continued to attack the Iroquois from 1697 to 1700. By 1699 the Iroquois were essentially defeated and unable to obtain help from the English, they sought peace with the French.105 The military strength of the Iroquois was shattered. In 1689 the Iroquois had 2800 warriors, by 1698 only 1230 remained. Not all of the depopulation resulted from outright war for disease had ravaged the Iroquois nation as well.106 Furthermore, French missionary activity, carried on between periods of war, succeeded in convincing many Iroquois to move to Canada.107 According to Jennings, "Onondaga chief Sadeganaktie complained in 1701 that the French 'have drained us of our people. They all goe to Canada and that upon pretense of Religion and to be converted. Wee see itt is only to enslave us'11108 Not only could the Iroquois not match up with the French in battle any longer, but the Western tribes lost their fear of the Iroquois. Iroquois territorial integrity was threatened beyond repair, Indian tribes began moving back into the Ohio country and the Iroquois were even compelled to ask the English to build some forts for their protection109 The Iroquois economy was ruined from the protracted warfare and regular hunts had ceased over this period. All tolled, the Iroquois were on the brink of a total defeat and faced the loss of their influence in the Eastern woodlands. This thumbnail sketch of the transition in Iroquois power, from strength in 1660 to defeat in 1699, purposely glosses over the bloody raids and other warfare that occurred almost constantly during this forty year period. From the destruction of the Hurons in 1649, through the period of seizing the Ohio country and either exterminating or adopting conquered tribes, through the bloody war with the Susquehannocks whom were defeated and partially incorporated into Iroquoisiio, to the bitter conclusion of practically a century of trade relations or war with the French, the Iroquois proved their prowess as warriors. Yet, is this the feature of their culture which explains their prominence in the eastern woodlands? If so, then how can the subsequent forty year period, from 1700 to the 1740's, be explained? The Iroquois were able to maintain their influence in the region under different conditions: not through warfare but through diplomacy. True, the threat of Iroquois war proved to be persuasive after the turn of the eighteenth century, and this is based on the reputation of their fierceness proven in the seventeenth century. Yet, the nature of Iroquois power rested not merely on their war-making abilities, but on the institutional structure which directed and focused their capabilities. As Jennings states, 11[t1he true strength of the Five Nations arose less from bellicosity than from their hospitality. Their losses from war were incalculably great. Their gains by negotiations and agreement offset the losses.11111 The key to Iroquois power and influence has already been mentioned. Warfare and diplomacy were emergent aspects of the underlying cultural conditions which had developed a vital trait: the ability to adapt conservative traditions to current circumstances. The fundamental truth of this ability is confirmed by events that occurred long after the Iroquois were in decline, after the American Revolution. Iroquois culture was revitalized by Handsome Lake by taking traditions and forging new meanings from them.112 The syncretic religion devised by Handsome Lake persists to this day. Iroquois prominence in war is spectacularly obvious, but their diplomacy is equally significant. More important than both of these qualities is the fact that their culture ably united these tendencies and shaped them as tools to be used for their own advantage. Iroquois diplomatic relations with the French began as early as 1624 when a treaty of trade was agreed upon.113 Other treaties with the French or their Indian allies were agreed upon throughout the seventeenth century. This tends to confirm a point made by Richard Haan, described earlier. Iroquois culture tended to treat each treaty as a separate entity and diplomatic relations required periodic reaffirmation according to circumstance. Thus, as mentioned, the various "chains" required occasional "brightening." This implies that the Iroquois never fully surrendered their sovereignty, regardless of the English perspective, and this view is buttressed by the fact that in 1684 the French were offered a place within the Covenant Chain. Although French Governor La Barre was humiliated in this phase of Iroquois French relations, when Garangula, an Onondaga chief, tried to bring New France into the Chain, the French refused.114 If the Iroquois were subjects of the English crown, would they be likely to ally with their greatest enemy without consulting the English? In fact, the English at this time tried to discourage the Iroquois from treating with the French, and succeeded in persuading the Mohawks and the Senecas to this end.115 This raises another issue, that of Iroquois unity. As Colden points out in his discussion of this process in 1684, the Jesuits has succeeded in influencing some of the nations of Iroquoia, while the English had their influence.116 Richter elaborates on these factional tendencies within Iroquoia, saying that Jesuit missionary activity changed the factions among the Five Nations. Not only were there now pro-French and pro-British factions, there were also Christian and traditionalist factions.117 Although many Christian converts went to Caughnawaga in Canada, some also stayed behind.118 At the same time Garangula was trying to persuade Governor La Barre to join the Covenant Chain, some Seneca members were strongly opposed to the idea. The French were suppliers of Seneca enemies and in August, 1684, at Albany, a Seneca spoke to a representative of the French Governor, complaining that 11[w]hen the Governor of Canada speaks to us of the Chain, he calls us Children, and saith, I am your Father, you must hold fast to the Chain, and I will do the same: I will protect you as a Father does his Children. Is this protection, to speak thus with his lips, and at the same Time to knock us on the Head, by assisting our enemies [the "tuihtuih-ronoons" or Miamis] with Ammunition?"119 The give-and-take of diplomatic relations can be seen from these events. The French evidently were willing to consider a place in the Covenant Chain but ultimately rejected that place. The Iroquois were divided into factions with regard to relations with the French and no clear consensus could be found at this time. Fifteen years later, the Iroquois and French had changed places; the French had the upper hand. In 1700, the results would be different: the Iroquois would find consensus and a treaty with the French was formalized. Then, as in 1684, the factions which divided Iroquoia threatened to prevent a treaty, but Iroquois defeat, combined with a cultural process which provided for unification of the factions, changed the outcome. The critical feature of Iroquois culturc-., which made this possible was not their war-making capability, nor even their diplomacy. It was their ability to adapt to change while maintaining traditions which reaffirmed Iroquois unity. War, having been unsuccessful, now yielded to diplomacy, but the content of that diplomacy could not have been possible without an underlying stratum which provided a method for holding factionalism together. Richter points out that Great Peace ceremonial practices had been adopted in diplomacy by 1645.120 An excellent example of how this worked occurred in 1690, after the massacre at Schenectady. The Iroquois exchanged belts with the English and performed the ritual to condole the dead, then they consulted and . I I 34 negotiated political and diplomatic matters with the 121 British. Earlier a distinction between sachems and village headmen was made. While the hereditary sachems performed a ceremonial role in society, orators and village leaders often gained political power through their merit. The French threat prompted a number of meetings between the merit-based leaders, at first on an informal basis, but later on a more formal basis. By the 16801s, regular meetings among these leaders occurred. In 1690 a meeting gathered to discuss peace proposals made by Governor Frontenac as well as to discuss some proposals made by the Ottawas. The proceedings followed Grand Council conventions: words of condolence, exchanges of wampum, the nations followed their hierarchy. Yet, contrary to convention, there were 80 participants and not the regular 50 of a Grand Council. Furthermore, many of the participants were not League sachems and a delegation from Albany was treated as equal to the Five Nations. Thus, Richter points out, this was not a ceremony of the Great Peace, but a meeting of political leaders who followed custom and tradition.122 Richter then describes the factions that emerged from the many meetings of this kind which occurred in the 1690's. Keeping with tradition, the leaders were Onondagas, the "firekeepers", and broke down into three factions: pro-French, pro-English, and neutralist. All these leaders "played key roles in bringing about an end to the Iroquois phase of King William's War in the comprehensive treaties with New France and the Indian allies that comprised the Grand Settlement of 1701.,,123 Aradgi directed the efforts of the Iroquois to treat with the French and their allies; Sadeganaktie worked to maintain the Covenant Chain with the English; Teganissorens strove to maintain Iroquois independence by working to keeps these factions 124 together. Richter concisely presents the significance of the events in 1700 and 1701, saying 11[t]he Grand Settlement of 1701, therefore, should be seen not only as a diplomatic settlement abroad, but also, and perhaps more importantly, as a delicate accommodation among Iroquois factions at home.11125 This "accommodation" would not have been possible unless Iroquois institutions had the ability to adapt to circumstances and still remain coherent with previous traditions. Just as warfare grew out of the Mourning wars to encompass economic considerations, external diplomacy grew out of the practices devised to create internal harmony among the Iroquois. This is the font of Iroquois persistence as a forceful and decisive player in the eastern woodlands during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The Treaties of 1701 The events leading up to the treaties of 1701 are ably narrated by Richard Aquila.126 The process began informally in March, 1700 when two Iroquois contacted the new Governor of New France, Callieres, and suggested that peace be attempted. The Iroquois messengers claimed to have no authority to act for the entire Five Nations, but did manage to obtain a cessation of hostilities.127 By May it was clear that the Iroquois were going to treat with the French. The English feared the Iroquois would do that as a sovereign nation and not as subjects of England. Governor Bellomont of New York had, in April, written the Board of Trade in London saying that an Iroquois alliance with the French could result in the English being forced off the continent. English fears were mollified a bit when, in June, pro-English Iroquois met with New York officials and denounced the pro-French elements within the League.128 Nevertheless, in July, Onondaga and Seneca representatives gave Callieres some wampum belts and began tentative negotiations. The Cayugas, Mohawks, and Oneidas were not represented, quite possibly because they did not desire peace with the French.129 As a result of this contact, the French sent three ambassadors to Iroquoia, a Jesuit and two well-respected soldiers, one of whom, Joncaire, had been previously adopted by the Seneca. These ambassadors were able to convince the Iroquois, who were weary of war, that New France wanted peace.130 Governor Bellomont provoked a strong reaction in Iroquoia that helped push them towards negotiations with the French when he ordered the sachems not to treat with the French. The Iroquois response was to interpret this as a challenge to Iroquois sovereignty and the League Council decided to continue negotiations with the French. Teganissorensf a leader of the peace faction as well as a neutralist, was chosen as the Council speaker. Delegates were sent to Montreal where they arrived in September, 1700.131 These deputies requested the French return all prisoners, open trade to the Iroquois at Fort Cataraqui and provide a smith there to repair guns and goods, and to provide a guarantee of French protection should the English decide to retaliate for negotiating a separate peace. Callieres agreed, got the French-allied Indians to agree to an end to warfare, and so a preliminary treaty was signed on September 8, 1700.132 Meanwhile, some Iroquois representatives were talking to Governor Bellomont in New York. While it is unclear just how much authority they had, they did not hazard the negotiations with New France. When Governor Belloment requested that they seize any Jesuits within Iroquoiaf these representatives refused. Yet, in April 1701, the Iroquois renewed their peace with Pennsylvania, possibly to limit potential conflict with the English over a treaty signed with the French.133 In June, 1701, the Iroquois clearly stated their intent. There were French and English envoys in Onondaga at the time and once again Teganissorens was selected as the Council Speaker. He announced the decision that the Iroquois would honor their preliminary agreement with the French. The French had, in the meanwhile, intervened in a dispute between the Iroquois and the Ottawa, thus demonstrating their seriousness. Teganissorens then said, "Five delegates are about to set out for Montreal, two others will go to Albany; I myself will remain on my mat, to show all the world that I take no side, and wish to preserve a strict neutrality.11134 The Iroquois had staked out a position: they would negotiate with both the English and the French, but would remain neutral. Aquila suggests, with good reason, that this was more than a tactic of diplomacy, it was also a compromise within the League to lessen factional strife.135 In September, 1701, the Grand Peace Treaty was signed at Montreal. The treaty was ratified by the French and their Indian allies and by the Iroquois. There was a wide geographical representation of tribes present, among them Hurons, Ottawas, Weas, Sacs, Menominees, Miamis, Ojibwas, Illinois, and Abenakis. The treaty ended the war of the previous twenty years and contained provisions favorable to the French and their allies. The Jesuits were given more freedom of movement, while the Iroquois acknowledged the rights of other tribes to live and hunt in the Ohio country. Overall, relations improved between the French, the Iroquois, and many of the tribes associated with the treaty.136 Previously, in July, 1701, the Iroquois had signed another treaty with the English. Its main provision was the cession of a large tract of land south of Lake Erie and Lake Huron. By this means the Iroquois hoped to prevent French encroachment on all their hunting grounds and requested that the English protect their rights to hunt there. Aquila claims this treaty is as significant as the later one in Montreal because it renewed the Covenant Chain and showed the English that the Iroquois were not merely changing sides. It also probably helped mollify English reaction to the treaty at Montreal, as well as served to accommodate the pro-English factions within the League.137 The treaties of 1701 changed the complexion of Iroquois power. Defeated, though not broken, from a military standpoint, they managed through diplomacy to ensure their survival, gain time to recover from the devastating wars, and perhaps most of all, to preserve internal unity while establishing themselves as the balance of power between the French and the English. Clearly, this was a demonstration of Iroquois autonomy and sovereignty, even though the conditions were not entirely favorable. In the process of making concessions to both the French and the English, they managed to obtain neutrality. The Iroquois had been useful to the British in many ways, by the wealth of the fur trade and by acting as a barrier to the French. The Iroquois had been a nemesis to the French for a long time, and were eventually beaten into a position where the French could have crushed them. Yet, the Iroquois managed to take a course that kept them in a position of influence for four more decades. Anthony F.C. Wallace sums up the result of the Iroquois transition in policy, which "led to commercial profit and to the seizure of the balance of power between the French and the British. It was a policy that required of the Iroquois as much duplicity in diplomatic dealings with the Europeans as the Europeans practiced toward them; its success is measured by the fact that both the British and the French alternated constantly between the conviction that the Iroquois were on their own side and the conviction that they had turned to the enemy."138 Did the Iroquois possess a transcendental character? Among all the changes of the seventeenth century, during which the Iroquois warred, treated, resolved internal problems, and in the process gained and maintained a large measure of power derived from a variety of means, were there any qualities which can be isolated and shown to be an ordering principle by which Iroquoia can be better understood? Any qualities which could define the nation as such? The experts suggest this is so and describe it as the ability to adapt within tradition. Their institutional structure, which combined both hunting and agricultural forms of social organization in a unique way, allowed for an invariant which accommodated kinship and heredity with merit and prowess, and which smoothed the transition from loosely related groups to highly integrated nations. As contact with the Europeans evolved, the Iroquois took this further and extended their internal patterns of "problem-solving" to external affairs, rising in the process to a position of great power. When that position was threatened, they once again used these patterns to preserve internal unity and ensure their survival as a nation, at least for a while. The treaties of 1701 represent the coming together of all these elements; from strength to neutrality the Iroquois were not diminished. Footnotes Cadwallader Colden, The History Of the Five Indian Nations of Canada (New York: AMS Press, 1973), p. xx. 2 Colden, pp. xli-xlii. 3 S.C. Kimm, The Iroquois (Middleburgh, New York: The Press of Pierre Danforth, 1900), p. 16; Colden, p. vxii. 4 Kimm, p. 16. 5 Richard Aquila, The Iroquois Restoration (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983), p. 30. 6 Lewis Henry Morgan, League of the Iroguois (Secaucus, New Jersey: The Citadel Pressf 1975), p. 3. 7 Francis Jennings, "Iroquois Alliances in American Historyf" in The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy., ed. Francis Jennings (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), pp. 37-38. 8 Dwight L. Smith, "Mutual Dependency and Mutual Distrust," in The American Indian Experience, ed. Philip Weeks (Arlington Heights: Forum Press Inc., 1988), p. 49. 9 Francis Jennings, "Introduction," in The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy, ed. Francis Jennings (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), p. xiv. 10 Ibid., p. xiv. 11 Ibid., p. xiv. 12 Ibid., p. xiv 13 Wilcomb Washburn, "Foreward," in Beyond the Covenant Chain:the Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North American, 1600-1800, eds. Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987), p. xiii. 14 Jennings, "Introduction", P. xv. 15 Ibid., p. xv. 16 Ibid.f p. xv. 17 Colden, p. xxvii. 18 William N. Fenton, Parker on the Iroquois, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971), p. 11. 19 Fenton, p. 4. 20 For example, Cadwallader Colden. 21 Daniel K. Richter, "Introduction," in Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800, eds. Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987) p. 5. 22 Ibid., p. 5. 23 Kimm, passim. 24 Colden, passim. 25 Morgan, passim. 26 Fenton, Parker on the Iroquois, passim. 27 Fenton, in Parker, pp. 38-47. 28 Fenton, in Parker, p. 7. 29 Fenton, in Parker, pp. 38-47. 30 Daniel K. Richter, "Ordeals of the Longhouse," in Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800, eds. Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987) p. 11. 31 Ibid., p. 11. 32 Sara Stites, Economics of the Iroquois (Bryn Mawr: Bryn Mawr College Monographs, 1905) p. 2. 33 James P. Ronda, "Black Robes and Boston Men" in The American Indian Experience, ed. Philip Weeks, (Arlington Heights: Forum Press Inc., 1988) passim. 34 Anthony F.C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), p. 111. 35 Wallace, p. 112. 36 Jennings, "Iroquois Alliances," p. 38. 37 William N. Fenton, "Structure, Continuity, and Change in the Process of Iroquois Treaty Making" in The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy, ed. Francis Jennings, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985) p. 22. 38 Wallace, p. 112. 39 Morgan, p. 40. 40 Wallace, p. 112. 41 Jennings, "Iroquois Alliances," pp. 37-38. 42 Ibid., p. 37 43 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 44 Ibid., p. 38. 45 Ibid., p. 38. 46 Wallace, p. 112. 47 Fenton, Parker, p. 8. 48 Ibid., p. 8. 49 Fenton, Parker, passim. 50 Morgan, pp. 56-81.; also Stites, pp. 23-24. 51 Morgan, pp. 56-81. 52 Stites, p. 97. 53 Stites, p. 40. 54 Colden, p. xxxiii. 55 Wallace, pp. 28-29.; also Stites, pp. 98-99. 56 Kimm, p. 20.; also Colden, p. xvi. 57 Ibid., p. 20; p. xvi. 58 Richter, "Ordeals," p. 19. 59 Morgan, p. 58. 60 Colden, p. 10. 61 Wallace, p. 42. 62 Wallace, p. 44. 63 Wallace, p. 22. 64 Kimm, p. 14. 65 Fenton, "Structure," p'. 9. 66 Richter, "Ordeals," p. 21. 67 Wallace, p. 39. 68 Aquila, pp. 36-37. 69,Richter, "Ordeals," pp. 25-26. 70 Fenton, "Structure," P. 9. 71 Wallace, p. 39. 72 Colden, pp. xv-xviii. 73 Kimm, pp. 18-19. 74 Richter, "Ordeals," p. 23. 75 Fenton, "Structure," P. 5. 76 Fenton, "Structure," p. 12. 77 Aquila, pp. 36-37. 78 Ibid., p. 37. 79 Richter, "Ordeals," pp. 19-20. 80 Stites, p. 20. 81 Aquila, p. 37. 82 Morgan, p. 12. 83 Richter, "Ordeals," pp. 19-20.; also Colden, P. xxvii. 84 Ronda, pp. 11-20. 85 Aquila, p. 38. 86 Richter, "Ordeals," pp. 21-22. 87 Aquila, p. 39.; also Richter, "Ordeals," p. 21. 88 Richter, "Ordeals," P. 22. 89 Richter, "Ordeals," pp. 22-23. 90 Aquila, p. 39. 91 Aquila, p. 40.; also Colden, pp. 17-18. 92 Aquila, pp. 40-41. 93 Aquila, p. 41. 94 Jennings, "Iroquois Alliances," p. 38. 95 Jennings, "Iroquois Alliances," pp. 38-39. 96 Richard L. Haan, "Covenant and Consensus," in Beyoind the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800, eds. Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987), pp. 41-42. 97 Jennings, "Iroquois Alliances," pp38-39. 98 Fenton, "Structure," p. 22. 99 Haan, p. 43. 100 Haan, pp. 41-42. 101 "Descriptive Treaty Calendar" in The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy, ed. Francis Jennings (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), p. 161. 102 Aquila, p. 43. 103 Aquila, p. 44. 104 Aquila, pp 44-45. 105 Aquila, p. 45. 106 Aquila, pp. 70-71. 107 Robert J. Surtees, "The Iroquois in Canada," in The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy, ed. Francis Jennings (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), p. 67. 108 Jennings, "Iroquois Alliances," p. 39. original spelling. 109 Aquila, pp. 71-74. 110 "Descriptive Calendar," p. 160. Some went to Iroquoia, others to the Delaware. 1ll Jennings, "Iroquois Alliances," p. 41. 112 Richter, "Ordeals," pp. 26-27.; also Wallace, passim. 113 ,Descriptive Calendar," p. 160. 114 Descriptive Calendar," p. 161. 115 Colden, p. 60. 116 Ibid., p. 60. 117 Richter, "Ordeals," p. 24. 118 Surtees, p. 67. 119 Colden, p. 56. 120 Richter, p. 22. 121 Fenton, "Structure," p. 21. 122 Richter, "Ordeals," pp. 25-26. 123 Richter, "Ordeals," p. 26. 124 Ibid., p. 26. 125 Ibid., p. 26. 126 Aquila, pp. 46-67. 127 Aquila, p. 46. 128 Aquila, p. 47. 129 Aquila, p. 48. 130 Aquila, pp. 50-52. 131 Aquila, pp. 52-53. 132 Aquila, pp. 54-56. 133 Aquila, pp. 57-58. 134 Aquila, p. 59. 135 Aquila, p. 60. 136 Aquila, pp. 62-65. 137 Aquila, p. 67. 138 Wallace, p. 112. Bibliography Aquila, Richard. The Iroquois Restoration. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1983. Colden, Cadwallader. The History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada, two volumes. AMS Press, New York, 1973. Fenton, William N. (ed.). Parker on the Iroquois. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1971. Jennings, Francis (ed.). The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1985. Kimm, S.C. The Iroquois. Press of Pierre Danforth, Middleburgh, 1900. Morgan, Lewis Henry. League of the Iroquois. The Citadel Press, Secaucus, 1975. Richter, Daniel K. and Merrell, James H. (eds.). Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1987. Ronda, James P. "Black Robes and Boston Men." The American Indian Experience, ed. Philip Weeks, Forum Press, Inc., Arlington Heights, 1988, pp 3-34. Smith, Dwight L. "Mutual Dependency and Mutual Distrust." The American Indian Experience, ed. Philip Weeks, Forum Press Inc., Arlington Heights, 1988, pp. 49-65. Stites, Sara Henry. Economics of the Iroquois. Bryn Mawr College Monographs, Bryn Mawr, 1905. Turner III, Frederick W. (ed.). The Portable North American Indian Reader, Penguin Books, New York, 1974. Wallace, Anthony F.C. The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca. Vintage Books, New York, 1972. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
sois Posted June 13, 2010 Report Share Posted June 13, 2010 tl;dr Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Jamie_B Posted June 13, 2010 Author Report Share Posted June 13, 2010 [quote name='oldschooler' date='12 June 2010 - 05:24 PM' timestamp='1276377892' post='892803'] In some cases it was sold to us even. But that wasn't the point. The Indians had no immigration laws. So it wasn't illegal. And those cartoons are dumb. Also, a lot of Countries were founded off of battles and taking of land. The U.S.A. is not exclusive in that regards. again. [/quote] Oh I'm quite aware that he who has the biggest guns wins. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
oldschooler Posted June 13, 2010 Report Share Posted June 13, 2010 [quote name='Jamie_B' date='13 June 2010 - 01:01 AM' timestamp='1276408885' post='892820'] Oh I'm quite aware that he who has the biggest guns wins. [/quote] Actually, the foundation of this Country came from kicking the ass of the dudes with the biggest guns. But that doesn't really have anything to do with the topic. The fact is, we are a sovereign Country that has laws against illegal immigration. Yes, companies and businesses should be punished for employing illegal immagrants. But that does not mean those immigrants aren't at fault and shouldn't be dealt with too. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Jamie_B Posted June 13, 2010 Author Report Share Posted June 13, 2010 [quote name='oldschooler' date='13 June 2010 - 08:19 AM' timestamp='1276431582' post='892831'] [color="#FF0000"]Actually, the foundation of this Country came from kicking the ass of the dudes with the biggest guns.[/color] But that doesn't really have anything to do with the topic. The fact is, we are a sovereign Country that has laws against illegal immigration. Yes, companies and businesses should be punished for employing illegal immagrants. But that does not mean those immigrants aren't at fault and shouldn't be dealt with too. [/quote] Except in the case of the American Indian, in that case both we and the redcoats took what we wanted. As well as the pilgrims who came before we and the brits, but that's neither here nor there. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
oldschooler Posted June 13, 2010 Report Share Posted June 13, 2010 [quote name='Jamie_B' date='13 June 2010 - 08:29 AM' timestamp='1276435746' post='892834'] Except in the case of the American Indian, in that case both we and the redcoats took what we wanted. As well as the pilgrims who came before we and the brits, but that's neither here nor there. [/quote] In some cases the Indians helped us or sold us land though. Still though, that shit has nothing to do with the topic, or the dumbass irrelevant cartooons. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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