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Maybe today’s Navy is just not very good at driving ships


Homer_Rice

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31 minutes ago, Homer_Rice said:

Passing this along for the squids on the board. Disturbing, if true.

 

 

Sadly, there is MUCH truth in that article and it is even more disturbing that you know my friend... Coincidentally I retired in 2003, when they did away with basic SWO training. Many of the factors mentioned are basically 100% cold hard facts, but the "new" Navy wouldn't listen to us old salts. The only real inaccuracy I see in the article is  “A radar can tell you something is out there, but it can’t tell you if it’s turning,” Hoffman said. “Only your eyes can tell you that. You have to put your eyes on the iron.”

That is not true, radar return DOES tell you when a contact turns, heading, speed and direction of turn. That being said, you should ALWAYS put eyes on the iron to make sure. That was extremely effective in the old navy, and I'm sure it would be today.

 

I still cannot fathom the metric ass ton of mistakes that lead to these collisions... 15 years sea time out of a 20 year career, and I NEVER came close to an accidental collision. I was Officer of the Deck qualified and knew how to drive destroyers, read radars, avoid collisions, and basic seamanship and mariners skills. I was NOT a naval officer either, senior enlisted.

 

Those lives lost with all the technology at hand is unacceptable, and also a very good reason to NOT throw out tradition, training, and teamwork and try to replace it with technology.

 

Now the "accidental/on purpose" collisions were another story altogether...

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I left in 78. Served on 2 ships. We once hit the pier during refresher training in GITMO--spilled a bit of fuel. We once did an emergency breakaway during a replenishment because the other ship lost its steering. (I was the fantail lookout during that evolution and it was pretty scary--we were about 50 feet apart before the breakaway was completed. I only spent time as a lookout (before I became a petty officer) and as a supply puke, it was only for sea and anchor, flight quarters, and other non-standard watches. I did spend time on the bridge during GQ as a petty officer--damage control phone talker plotting the reports. Lastly, when the push came to get me to reenlist, I told the MPOC that I'd do it if I could become a quartermaster. They had billets for my rate (SH) so that was a no go. So I was a go-go!

 

During my time in the officers were good--as were the leading QM petty officers; we transited all kinds of straits and other "careful" maneuvers. I do recall lots of guidance/mentoring from OODs to JOODs when I stood a port or starboard lookout.

 

A few observations, 40 years later, and with a bunch of professional experience under my belt:

 

--generational pass-down of institutional (and informal) knowledge is much less valued, and is even one of the important processes which is trimmed in the budget by penny-wise, pound foolish bosses everywhere. Similarly, you see a lot of expenditure on quality control because it is seen as an unnecessary overhead expense. The sad irony here is that boardrooms throughout our economy-as-a-whole have turned the economy into a post-industrial nightmare wherein certain forms of overhead spending have become the primary driver on balance sheets. The financialization of the economy is the source for most of this. Over-reliance on computer technology is another source.

 

I look around at younger generations and feel a combination of anger and sadness because they'll be reaping what a bunch of greedy, know-nothing, executives have sown. And like a ship, this doesn't get turned around very quickly. We're still in the "Fuck me, I can't plot a course" phase of a lot of this--though I will say that there have been a few signs of awakening in recent years.

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1 hour ago, Homer_Rice said:

Oh, and as a boot, I fell for the CGU-11 fake contact bit as a lookout!

Didn't fall for it but was made to stand the "mail buoy" watch... lol.

Good times, but they've even taken away a lot of old traditions, saying it was "hazing". Now there were some things that needed to go by the wayside, but corporate America and civilians just don't understand that the so called "hazing" is a rite of passage that built up morale, formed friendship and teamwork bonds, and actually contributed to the overall readiness of the services.

 

Oh well.... GET OFF MY LAWN YOU DANG KIDS!!!

 

That's all that the politically correct asshats hear.

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2 cents. ID 10 T oil is a real thing as is a Bosun punch...

 

Surface Warfare training, as a whole, was watered down and was basically a gimmee thing some time around 2000. I qualified in the early 90s and Admiral Flanigan pinned it on solidly. Bent pin and bloody chest was a very proud moment. Those were the days.

 

Lastly, no amount of computer simulated environment will suffice for real time hands on non-simulated conditions. Period.

 

Sent from my 2PS64 using Go-Bengals.com mobile app

 

 

 

 

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2 hours ago, Numbers said:

2 cents. ID 10 T oil is a real thing as is a Bosun punch...

 

Surface Warfare training, as a whole, was watered down and was basically a gimmee thing some time around 2000. I qualified in the early 90s and Admiral Flanigan pinned it on solidly. Bent pin and bloody chest was a very proud moment. Those were the days.

 

Lastly, no amount of computer simulated environment will suffice for real time hands on non-simulated conditions. Period.

 

Sent from my 2PS64 using Go-Bengals.com mobile app

 

 

 

 

Amen shipmate, now go get me a bucket of steam and ten feet of waterline!

 

On a serious note, training needs to be long and hard and OJT even longer and harder before you get your quals. If you're not bleeding when it's pinned on, you didn't earn it.

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9 hours ago, Homer_Rice said:

Similarly, you see a lot of expenditure on quality control because it is seen as an unnecessary overhead expense.

Correction: ...a lack of expenditure...

 

My favorite "hazing" moment came when one of the SKs in our office sent a boot off for some relative bearing grease. Typical haze: sent the fellow down to the bottom of the boat to GSK, then called GSK and had them send him to the forward paint locker.

 

Half hour later the kid comes back. He has his dungaree shirt bloused out with 5 or 6 little cans. Puts them on the desk and starts to leave. The SK2 says, "Where are your going?"

 

The boot replies: "I'm going back for the big ones."

 

I'm guessing that all of us here were smart enough to NOT put one of those metallic insignias on their hat when they got promoted up the petty officer ranks! Sore arm those days, but totally worth it.

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I don't know how onboard training is nowadays, but when I was in it was really serious stuff. Refresher training at GITMO was maybe the hardest month I spent while in. But even afterwards for normal stuff, both out at sea drills as well as in port nightly fire drills--if we didn't get it right, we'd do it again until we did. My first ship was more strict than my second ship (both gator freighters) but even so.

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Note: In regards to USS Antietam running around while anchoring. This incident happens more than gets reported. We ran aground in the early 90s while pulling into homeport (Little Creek). Damaged our fathometer and a few other things. However, because we only ran soft aground and not hard aground, it was easier to "overlook" by those who would have been charged with dereliction.

A great write up on the grounding of a Navy ship can be found at https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_USS_Port_Royal_grounding

A calamity of errors is common but, as stated above, truly boils down to ineffective training.

Sent from my 2PS64 using Go-Bengals.com mobile app

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I just learned of the Honda Point Disaster recently.  I'm sure you salty mofos know all about it, but I'd never heard of it.  Kind of the opposite problem from what you're describing; not trusting new tech + rigid thinking.


From what I understand from reading the report... "The navigators aboard the lead ship USS Delphy did not take into account the effects of the strong currents and large swells in their estimations." In other words, old school tech works but does not if you fail to take into account ALL factors. RDF during that time period was not reliable. Vacuum tubes were not adequately shielded from shock or EMI. However, when working, RDF was accurate. Might as well add in the area around Honda point and a disaster was just around the corner.

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16 hours ago, Numbers said:

 


From what I understand from reading the report... "The navigators aboard the lead ship USS Delphy did not take into account the effects of the strong currents and large swells in their estimations." In other words, old school tech works but does not if you fail to take into account ALL factors. RDF during that time period was not reliable. Vacuum tubes were not adequately shielded from shock or EMI. 

 

 

A fact that also gave us rock music, in a way.

 

Kind of surprised this hasn't been made into a movie.

 

 

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  • 1 month later...

What’s sad is that old sailors like me told the idiots these things years ago, and were summarily dismissed because either we weren’t commissioned officers or because they wanted to rely on and trust technology over practices that had worked for 200 years.

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When I was in during the 70s, these practices were a given and technology was an aid. It's my opinion--and this is true across all kinds of disciplines in the world--that the flip-flop towards reliance on unproven technology at the expense of older, more proven techniques is the cause for so much of what ails the operating practices of many companies and other organizations currently.

 

It isn't so much the introduction of new technology that is the problem. That has to happen to make the world a better place. It's more the manner of transition and the fundamental philosophical changes such inept changes make that cause the problems.  There's a reductionist tendency at work during these changes that creates obstacles. That's particularly true because we are in the early stages of a new scientific revolution. Wonders like artificial intelligence (at the fringes), algorithmic predictors, etc... can be beneficial once they reach a certain level of maturity. But, to insist that AI or algos will replace human creativity is fool's gold. Yet, that's implicit (and explicit in many cases) in many of the underlying justifications for the implementation of these new techniques.

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You’ve got that right Homer... and when I retired in 2003 the major push was on to streamline manning, defund the amount of ships, lower the maintenance on ships, lower the budget on training, and to rely on “smart ship” technology vice a human being.

 

We brought these disasters upon ourselves.

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  • 5 weeks later...
  • 2 months later...

Today the latest news on the incidents is... 

 

http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/16/politics/ex-navy-commanders-criminal-charges-collisions/index.html

 

"Ex-commanders face negligent homicide charges over deadly Navy collisions

 

The Navy also said there will be additional administrative actions for members of both crews."

 

I don't know what will truly happen to the commanders in question.   The Navy shot down an Air Force F4 in the late 80s.   It took 25 years for karma to catch up to that Ltjg.  His father who was a Rear Admiral at the time managed to help his son salvage his career despite dereliction of duty.   He failed to walk around and check his aircraft out before getting in to take off on a non live firing training mission.   He would have easily noticed his missiles were armed.   Fortunately that day it resulted in a couple of wet Air Force officers and not dead bodies floating in the Mediterranean.   One of the officers is now 100% disabled.   When they were rescued and onboard our carrier, they still did not know what happened or what they did wrong.   Once they were told,  they we're pissed.   Ltjg never flew again but managed to climb the ladder to success until he was under review for the promotion... 

 

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