Jump to content

Those wacky Iranians, what will they do next?


The PatternMaster

Recommended Posts

I thought I heard something about this... Except it was the Saudi Ambassador to the US. The timing on the release of this information probably has nothing to do with the subpoena Holder received. I am not implying anything but I guarantee somebody or someone does if they haven't already.

I think Obama can simply apologze to Iran for instigating the attempt on the ambassadors life. Everything should be ok after that.

[quote] Obama's State Department (run by Hillary Clinton) contacted the family of al-Qaida propagandist and recruiter Samir Khan to "express its condolences" to his family.[/quote]


[quote]secret cable dated Sept. 3, 2009, was recently released by WikiLeaks. Sent to Secretary of State Clinton, it reported Japan's Vice Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka telling U.S. Ambassador John Roos that "the idea of President Obama visiting Hiroshima to apologize for the atomic bombing during World War II is a 'nonstarter.'[/quote]

Note: I don't see an apology working. Perhaps we can simply tell them to stop again. Maybe that will work. Chamberlain anyone ?
Link to comment
Share on other sites

[quote name='Numbers' timestamp='1318457428' post='1044407']
I thought I heard something about this... Except it was the Saudi Ambassador to the US. The timing on the release of this information probably has nothing to do with the subpoena Holder received. I am not implying anything but I guarantee somebody or someone does if they haven't already.

I think Obama can simply apologze to Iran for instigating the attempt on the ambassadors life. Everything should be ok after that.






Note: I don't see an apology working. Perhaps we can simply tell them to stop again. Maybe that will work. Chamberlain anyone ?
[/quote]

You're missing the point that I don't believe our government's story.

Sorry, been lied to too many times, and the fact that you (and seemingly a large number of Americans) don't seem bothered by this saber rattling is deeply disturbing...
Link to comment
Share on other sites

[quote name='Elflocko' timestamp='1318457849' post='1044409']
You're missing the point that I don't believe our government's story.

Sorry, been lied to too many times, and the fact that you (and seemingly a large number of Americans) don't seem bothered by this saber rattling is deeply disturbing...[/quote]

I believe IRAN has been a threat to US interests for alot longer than most people realize. Why act now ?... (We've known all along they are part of the axis of evil, sarcasm intended). I am deeply bothered because it will be our brave men and women who do the fighting and not the politicians and/or their kids. I am reminded of a joke about women that can be applied towards politicians. How can you tell a politician is lying ? Their lips are moving. I take with a grain of salt just about everything. A skeptic if you will. However, I watched firsthand the body bags coming home from Lebanon. It only took 20 years for the information to come forth on that.

The following is concerning the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut;

[quote] On May 30, 2003, Lamberth found Iran legally responsible for providing Hezbollah with financial and logistical support that helped them carry out the attack. Lamberth concluded that the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, that Hezbollah was formed under the auspices of the Iranian government and was completely reliant on Iran in 1983, and that Hezbollah carried out the attack in conjunction with MOIS agents.

On September 7, 2007, Lamberth awarded $2,656,944,877 to the plaintiffs. The judgment was divided up among the victims; the largest award was $12 million to Larry Gerlach, who became a quadriplegic as a result of a broken neck he suffered in the attack.

The attorney for the families of the victims uncovered some new information, including a National Security Agency (NSA) intercept of a message sent from Iranian intelligence headquarters in Tehran to Hojjat ol-eslam Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi, the Iranian ambassador in Damascus. As it was paraphrased by presiding U.S. District Court Judge Royce C. Lamberth, "The message directed the Iranian ambassador to contact Hussein Musawi, the leader of the terrorist group Islamic Amal, and to instruct him ... 'to take a spectacular action against the United States Marines.'" Musawi's Islamic Amal was a breakaway faction of the Amal Movement and an autonomous part of embryonic Hezbollah.[/quote]

We have been a problem for a long time also and probably have alot to do with the current situation because of what transpired well before the US (ie.. Schwartzkopf Senior not Stormin' Norman, etc...)./British engineered overthrow of the elected leader of Iran all over nationalization of oil. For reference I believe the problem needs to be reviewed starting with the British division of the middle east after WW1 but one could probably go even further back than that when the US developed a foreign policy along the lines of British policy (IMHO).

International pressure will somewhat alleve the situation but will only hurt the common people of IRAN and not the politicians and/or people in power. Military action will only bury us further in debt and cause the needless loss of further lives. Not sure how or even suggest how an end to this can be had without someone getting hurt. Perhaps we should wait until they close down the Straights of Hormuz or launch their 1st nuclear strike...
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Iran's "threat" is tied directly into the straights of hormuz. (it probably reads better from the pdf)

[url="http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070326_iranoil_hormuz.pdf"]http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070326_iranoil_hormuz.pdf[/url]



[quote]
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006
Phone: 1 (202) 775-3270 • Fax: 1 (202) 457-8746
Web: http://www.csis.org/burke
Iran, Oil, and the
Strait of Hormuz
Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
March 26, 2007Cordesman: Iran, Oil, Hormuz 3/26/07 Page 2
The “Persian” or “Arabian” Gulf creates major strategic uncertainties for Iran, its
neighbors, and the world. It is a 600-mile-long body of water that separates Iran from the
Arabian Peninsula, and one of the most strategic waterways in the world due to its
importance in world oil transportation. Incidents in the Gulf can escalate quickly in ways
that neither Iran nor its potential opponents intend. Iran’s actions in Lebanon and in
dealing with Hamas and the PIJ can provoke other unintended crises, and Iran is caught
up in a broader, Sunni-dominated struggle for the future of Islam where some key Sunni
Islamist extremist movements deny the legitimacy of Shi’ite beliefs. Military history is
rarely determined by intentions and policy in peacetime, and crisis management often
becomes an oxymoron as event spiral out of control, misperceptions dominate actions,
and escalation becomes both asymmetric and an end in itself.
Iran and the Importance of Gulf Oil
The Gulf countries (Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates) produce nearly 30% of the world’s oil, while holding 57% (715 billion
barrels) of the world's crude oil reserves. Iran alone is estimated to hold 11.1 percent of
the world oil reserves (132.0 billion barrels of oil), and 15.3 percent of the world’s
natural gas reserves (970.8 trillion cubic feet).
1
Besides oil, the Persian Gulf region also
has huge reserves (2,462 trillion cubic feet -- Tcf) of natural gas, accounting for 45% of
total proven world gas reserves.
Iran’s coastline is particularly important because tanker and shipping routes pass so close
to Iran’s land mass, the islands it controls in the Gulf, and its major naval bases. At its
narrowest point (the Strait of Hormuz), the Gulf narrows to only 34 miles wide, with Iran
to the North and Oman to the south. The key passages through the Strait consist of 2-mile
wide channels for inbound and outbound tanker traffic, as well as a 2-mile wide buffer
zone.
Oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz account for roughly 40% of all world traded oil,
and the 17 MMBD or more of oil that normally are shipped through the Strait of Hormuz
goes eastwards to Asia (especially Japan, China, and India) and westwards (via the Suez
Canal, the Sumed pipeline). Any closure of the Strait of Hormuz would require use of
longer alternate routes. Such routes are now limited to the approximately 5-million-bbl/dcapacity East-West Pipeline across Saudi Arabia to the port of Yanbu, and the AbqaiqYanbu natural gas liquids line across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea, although the GCC
seems to have agreed to construct a new strategic pipeline through Oman to a port on the
Gulf of Oman.
2
Iran has long been involved in significant territorial disputes with its neighbors over
control of the Islands in the Gulf and offshore oil and gas resources. It faced the Iran-Iraq
War from 1980 to 1988, a “tanker war” with the U.S. over tanker movements through the
Gulf from 1987-1988, and the risks posed by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990-1991.Cordesman: Iran, Oil, Hormuz 3/26/07 Page 3
Ever since the time of the Shah, there has been a dispute between Iran and the UAE over
ownership of three strategically important islands near key tanker routes to the Strait of
Hormuz – Abu Musa, Greater Tunb Island, and Lesser Tunb Island. The three islands
were first seized by the Shah after British withdrawal from the Gulf in the early 1970s,
and were then occupied by Iranian troops in 1992. In 1995, the Iranian Foreign Ministry
claimed that the islands were "an inseparable part of Iran."
Iran has since rejected a 1996 proposal by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for the
dispute to be resolved by the International Court of Justice, an option supported by the
UAE. The GCC issued a statement reiterating its support for the UAE's sovereignty over
Abu Musa and the Tunbs on December 31, 2001, declared Iran's claims on the islands as
"null and void," and backed "all measures [...] by the UAE to regain sovereignty on its
three islands peacefully." It has repeatedly attempted to persuade Iran to agree to refer the
issue to the ICJ. Iran again refused the UAE’s offer of arbitration by the International
Court of Justice in September 2006, and the risk of a future clash or conflict remains. In
addition, Iran and Qatar have claimed ownership of the North field (where most of
Qatar’s gas reserves are), and the issue has never been fully resolved.
The strategic importance of the Gulf will also increase significantly with time. According
to the reference case estimate in the Energy Information Administration's International
Energy Outlook 2006, Gulf oil production is expected to reach about 28.3 million barrels
per day (MMBD) by 2010, 31.1 MMBD by 2020, and 36.8 MMBD by 2020; compared
to about 18.7 MMBD in 1990, 21.7 MMBD in 2000, and 23.7 MMBD in 2003. This
would increase Gulf oil production capacity to 33% of the world total by 2020 (107.6
MMBD and 36% by 2030 (123.3 MMBD), up from 28% in 2000.
3
As Figure One shows, the Gulf’s importance as a percent of total world exports will
most likely also increase, and the total volume of Gulf exports will increase from 22.5 to
34.3 MMBD. While much of this increase will go to Asia, it will also make a sharp
increase in indirect U.S. and European dependence on the Gulf. Asia is so dependent on
Gulf oil that a large amount of the energy Asia uses in producing goods for export to the
U.S. and Europe comes from Gulf oil exports. The exact rise that will actually occur in
Gulf exports is highly unpredictable, but parametric modeling of other price and
economic growth cases shows that significant rises seem highly likely over the next two
decades.Cordesman: Iran, Oil, Hormuz 3/26/07 Page 4
Figure One: The Growing Volume of Gulf Oil Exports 2003-2030
(In Millions of Barrels per Day)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2003 2.5 2.7 6.1 11.3 0.9 4.4 5.9 11.2 22.5
2030 3.5 3.3 5.8 12.6 5.8 8.4 7.4 21.6 34.3
N. America Europe Asia Total OECD China Other Asia
Rest of
World
Total NonOECD
Total Gulf
42.6% of all world exports in 2003
24% of total goes to Asia
44.4% of all world exports in 2030
58% of total goes to Asia
Source: DOE/EIA, International Energy Outlook, 2006, DOE, Washington, June 2006, Table 7, p. 34.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html.
The Iranian Threat in the Gulf
Iran has built up a large mix of unconventional forces in the Gulf that can challenge its
neighbors in a wide variety of asymmetric wars, including low-level wars of attrition.
These include a wide range of elements in the regular forces and IRGC as well as some
elements in the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), or Vezarat-e Ettela’ at va
Aminat-e Keshvar (VEVAK), which was installed following the revolution to replace the
now-disbanded National Organization for Intelligence and Security (SAVAK). In 2006,
the MOIS employed about 15,000 civilian staff. Its major tasks included intelligence
collection and operations in the Middle East and Central Asia as well as domestic
intelligence and monitoring of clerical and government officials, as well as work on
preventing conspiracies against the Islamic Republic.
Its air forces remain vulnerable in any form of mission, but are less vulnerable near
Iranian bases, sensor coverage, and SAM coverage. Its naval forces include its three Kiloclass submarines, which can harass or seek to interdict ships moving in an out of the
Gulf, a wide range of mines and vessels that can be used as mine layers or to release free
floating mines.
They also include roughly 140 light patrol and coastal combatants, including 11 Frenchdesigned Kaman-class missile patrol boats with 2-4 CSS-N-4/YJ-1/ “Sardine” anti-ship
missiles each. These are sea skimming, solid fueled missiles with a 42 to 50-kilometerCordesman: Iran, Oil, Hormuz 3/26/07 Page 5
range, 165 kilogram warheads, INS and active radar similar to the Exocet, and can be
used to harass civil shipping and tankers, and offshore facilities, as well as attack naval
vessels. Iran may well have far more advanced Russian and Chinese-supplied missiles as
well and claims to be developing advanced anti-ship and anti-fixed target missiles of its
own.
Iran made claims in the spring of 2006 that it was testing more advanced weapons for
such forces. These included a sonar-evading anti-ship missile that can be fired from
submarines as well as surface combatants that IRGC Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi claimed no
enemy warship could detect, and “no warship could escape because of its high velocity.”
Iran also claimed to be testing a new missile called the Kowsar with a very large warhead
and extremely high speed to attack “big ships and submarines” that it claimed could
evade radar and antimissile missiles. While such tests may have been real, Iran has made
so many grossly exaggerated claims about its weapons developments in the past, that it
seems they were designed more to try to deter U.S. military action and/or reassure the
Iranian public than truly being serious real world capabilities. It followed these actions up
in the late summer of 2006 by testing new submarine launched anti-ship missiles.
It has a 20,000 man naval branch in the IRGC that includes some 5,000 marines. This
branch of the IRGC has 10 Houdong missile patrol boasts with CSS-N-8/C-802/YJ-2
missiles with 165 kilogram warheads, active and inertial guidance, and maximum ranges
of 120 kilometers. It operates mobile land-based CSS-C-3/HY-2/Sea Eagle/Seersucker
anti-ship missiles that can be rapidly emplaced on the Iranian coast or islands in the Gulf
shipping channel. These systems have ranges of 95-100 kilometers, very large warheads,
and autocontrol and radar homing guidance. They can be targeted by a remote air link,
and the exact level of upgrading of these missiles since their initial delivery during the
Iran-Iraq War is unknown.
The IRGC has large numbers of Boghammar and other patrol boats are with recoilless
rifles, rocket launchers, manportable surface-to-air missiles, and anti-armor guided
weapons. The IRGC routinely uses small civilian ships and vessels in unconventional
operations in various exercises, including mine laying and raids on offshore facilities.
This force has facilities at Bandar-e-Abbas, Khorramshar, and on the islands of Larak,
Abu Musa, Al Farsiyah, Sirrir and the Halul oil platform. It can make use of additional
facilities at Iran’s main naval bases at Bander e-abbas, Bushehr, Kharg Island, Bandar eAnzelli, Bandar e-Khomeini, Bandar e-Mahshahr, and Chah Bahar. These forces can
rapidly disperse, and shelter in caves and hardened sites. Small ships can be very hard to
detect with most radars even in a normal sea state, and civilian ships can easily change
flags and meld in with commercial traffic.
According to one Israeli source, Iran plans to defeat the United States by attrition, trying
to exploit perceived American psychological vulnerabilities for a high number of
casualties. Further, the report states: “Iran’s military acquisitions reveal a rather defensive
mindset with an intention to deter against an attack rather than to win a war by
overwhelming force.
4Cordesman: Iran, Oil, Hormuz 3/26/07 Page 6
“Closing the Gulf?”
These light naval forces have special importance because of their potential ability to
threaten oil and shipping traffic in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, raid key offshore
facilities, and conduct raids on targets on the Gulf coast. Many Gulf energy facilities are
extremely vulnerable, and the GCC states are extremely vulnerable to any form of attack
on their desalination and coastal power facilities, and precision strikes on critical highcapacity, long-lead time replacement items in energy facilities and power grids. This
vulnerability might also allow Iran to carry out very successful air attacks in a surprise
raid with precision weapons, using IRGC “suicide” aircraft, and future UAVs and
precision cruise missiles. It is also possible that Iran could conduct coastal raids with
IRGC and/or Special Forces that went deeper into Southern Gulf territory.
Iran could not “close the Gulf” for more than a few days to two weeks even if it was
willing to sacrifice all of these assets, suffer massive retaliation, and potentially lose
many of its own oil facilities and export revenues. Its chronic economic mismanagement
has made it extremely dependent on a few refineries, product imports, and food imports.
It would almost certainly lose far more than it gained from such a “war,” but nations
often fail to act as rational bargainers in a crisis, particularly if attacked or if their regimes
are threatened.
Even sporadic, low-level attacks on Gulf shipping and facilities, however, could allow
Iran to wage a war of intimidation in an effort to pressure its neighbors. As Figure Two,
which is based on a recent International Energy Agency study shows, the current and
future volume of oil export traffic through the Gulf is steadily increasing and presents a
target with global strategic importance that will grow steadily in coming years even if one
exempts growing the growth in tanker shipments of LPG. This will make any threat that
sharply raises oil prices, deters smooth tanker flows and deliveries, and otherwise
interfers with energy exports of great importance, particularly in a world where every
developed economy is critically dependent on global trade and the continuing flow of
Asian heavy manufactures that are steadily more dependent on Gulf oil.
It should be noted, however, that Iran is acutely dependent on oil revenues, and that
attacks on its refineries and power plants could do immense retaliatory damage. In midSeptember of 2006, reports also surfaced that the U.S. navy was reconsidering older plans
for blocking two Iranian oil ports near the Straits of Hormuz. This apparently was
accompanied by a “prepare-to-deploy” order for several mine-warfare vessels.
5
In
February 2007, a second aircraft-carrier group was deployed to the Persian Gulf, and
reportedly plans to send a third one were considered.
6
Iran is also as vulnerable to attacks
on its oil platforms and loading facilities in the Gulf as the Southern Gulf states.
7Cordesman: Iran, Oil, Hormuz 3/26/07 Page 7
Figure Two The Importance of Gulf Oil Exports
Area of Export Flow Current Flow in MMBD Share of World Oil Demand in Percent
In 2004 In 2030 In 2030
Reference Lower Demand
Strait of Hormuz 17.4 21.2 28.1 19.4
Straits of Malacca/Far East 13 15.8 23.7 23.3
Bab el-Mandab 3.5 4.3 4.5 4.9
Suez 3.9 4.7 4.8 5.3
Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from material provided by Ambassador William C. Ramsay,
Deputy Executive Director, International Energy Agency, February 6, 2007.
1
BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2005.
2
Adapted from reporting by the Energy Information Agency of the Department of Energy.
3
International Energy Outlook, 2006, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/ieooil.html.
4
Uzi Rubin: The Global Reach of Iran’s Ballistic Missiles, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel
Aviv, November 2006, p. 1.
5
Gordon Lubold, “DoD refutes report of navy plans for War with Iran”, ArmyTimes.com, September 19,
2006.
6
Michael Hirsh and Maziar Bahari, “Hidden Wars with Iran”, Newsweek, February 19, 2007.
7
Arthur Herman, “How to fight Iran”, New York Post, January 26, 2007.[/quote]
Link to comment
Share on other sites

The Straits of Hormuz could be shut down a lot longer if a few oil tankers are sunk at its narrowest point which is 34 miles wide of which 6 miles or so is navigable and is 82 to 131 feet deep. About the height and width of one oil tanker. The rest of the 5 miles or so can be choked with Irans own ships or ships of other nations dumb enough to sail into the gulf. The other portions are easily shut off with what was mentioned in the article. What's even worse is that Israel would almost surely get involved which would torpedo any Arab support. The mere threat of shutting down the straits is enough to further increase the current financial world crisis.
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I know Russia backs Iran, if we go after Iran won't Russia come to their defense? Russia and China are still allies, so I would assume Russia and China would not like the US trying to rally international support against Iran. I was listening to NPR last night and they interviewed a number of Iranian politicial experts who said they didn't think this assissination attempt came from the leaders of the Iranian gov because it's not the way they do things. Very interesting to say the least, I'm interested to see where this goes.
Link to comment
Share on other sites

[quote name='Jamie_B' timestamp='1318521526' post='1044672']
How about we leave them the fuck alone? How about Israel has more than enough of a military to defend itself?
[/quote]

This.

The Iranian people don't want war with us, and I would hope that at least a majority of the American people feel the same way. This is our respective [b]governments[/b] putting us on the brink of a global catastrophe. The difference is that [b]we[/b] as Americans supposedly have [b]some [/b]control over our government and it's high time that we take the reigns and tell the people that supposedly work for us to tone down the rhetoric and back the fuck off.
Link to comment
Share on other sites

[quote name='Elflocko' timestamp='1318522581' post='1044682']

This.

The Iranian people don't want war with us, and I would hope that at least a majority of the American people feel the same way. This is our respective [b]governments[/b] putting us on the brink of a global catastrophe. The difference is that [b]we[/b] as Americans supposedly have [b]some [/b]control over our government and it's high time that we take the reigns and tell the people that supposedly work for us to tone down the rhetoric and back the fuck off.
[/quote]


So the fact that someone in the Iranian govt is trying to assissinate a govt official doesn't bother you?
Link to comment
Share on other sites

[quote name='The PatternMaster' timestamp='1318528913' post='1044729']


So the [b]fact [/b]that someone in the Iranian govt is trying to assissinate a govt official doesn't bother you?
[/quote]

Again, I don't believe our government's story. And the use of that word in this regard is suspect...
Link to comment
Share on other sites

[url="http://www.truth-out.org/why-i-published-us-intelligence-secrets-about-israels-anti-iran-campaign/1316550301"]http://www.truth-out.org/why-i-published-us-intelligence-secrets-about-israels-anti-iran-campaign/1316550301[/url]





[quote]
[b] Why I Published US Intelligence Secrets About Israel's Anti-Iran Campaign[/b]

[size=4]Tuesday 20 September 2011[/size][color=#990000][size=4][i]
by: Richard Silverstein, Truthout | News Analysis[/i][/size][/color]


[size=4][left]In 2009, Shamai Leibowitz was working secretly for the FBI, translating wiretapped conversations among Israeli diplomats in this country. He passed some transcripts of these conversations to me, which described an Israeli diplomatic campaign in this country to create a hostile environment for relations with Iran. I published excerpts from them in my blog, Tikun Olam.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]Leibowitz, who comes from a family of distinguished Israeli Orthodox public intellectuals, first came to prominence inside Israel when he signed a statement refusing to serve in the Occupied Territories. He went on to earn a law degree and was one of the Israeli attorneys who represented Palestinian Marwan Barghouti in his terror trial. In a statement certain to enrage Israelis and the Shin Bet officials responsible for apprehending Barghouti, Leibowitz likened his client's leadership of his people to that of Moses. Though he was referring to the fact that Moses killed an Egyptian who was beating an Israelite slave - which caused him to flee his homeland, accused of being the ancient equivalent of a terrorist - the subtlety of the historical comparison was undoubtedly lost on many Israelis.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]Leibowitz came to this country as a New Israel Fund (NIF) fellow to earn a US law degree in international human rights at Georgetown University. Though he completed his degree, NIF ended his affiliation with its program when the Israeli spoke at a Cambridge public event endorsing a boycott of Israel. The story made its way into the Israel press thanks to pro-Israel activists monitoring his activities here. When a mini-furor broke out both in Israel and here, NIF, showing its support for free speech, dropped Leibowitz from the program, even though he never stated that his remarks at the Massachusetts event represented NIF in any way. The NGO simply couldn't risk the wrath of the Israeli government since all its programming in Israel might be placed in jeopardy if it irritated the authorities.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]Living in Washington, DC, the Israeli activist next took a job teaching American diplomats being posted to Israel about the country, its culture, history and language. Once again, the pro-Israel crowd reported to Ben Caspit, Israel's right-wing columnist, that Leibowitz was now working for the State Department. He was subsequently fired from this job also.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]The Israeli Orthodox Jew was known in his religious community as a fine Torah reader who beautifully chanted the Torah portion at his Orthodox synagogue. However, when a well-connected member discovered Leibowitz' "past," they told the rabbi that he must take this great communal honor from him or they would leave the congregation. Such [url="http://thejewishchronicle.net/view/full_story/7789457/article-Shamai-Leibowitz-sentenced-for-leaking-FBI-secret"]shunning[/url] is, unfortunately, all too common in the Jewish community (remember Spinoza?) for those holding unpopular views of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Luckily, Leibowitz discovered a conservative synagogue whose rabbi embraced him despite his "baggage." Throughout his subsequent trials and tribulations, this rabbi and community have stood behind Leibowitz and his family.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]I began writing my blog in 2003. At the start, it was quite a lonely pursuit and there were almost no other blogs like it espousing a progressive approach to the Israeli-Arab conflict. In searching for an online community, I came across Shamai's[url="http://pursuingjustice.blogspot.com/"]Pursuing Justice blog[/url]. When I read his last name, I presumed he might be related to the eminent Leibowitz family and wrote to him. He confirmed he was the grandson of Yeshaia Leibowitz, one of the most distinguished Israeli philosophers and public intellectuals. His aunt was Nechama Leibowitz, an eminent professor of Bible at Hebrew University, with whom I studied when I was a student there.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]Shamai and I emailed each other infrequently. But our correspondence picked up during Operation Cast Lead, when we were both aghast at the role the IDF played in decimating Gaza and killing 1,400 - 1,100 of whom were civilians.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]After the war ended, he called me on the phone, which was unusual because I'd never spoken to him directly before. He asked if I wanted to see some materials he could send me. Until then, I'd never had anyone offer me materials in such a way, but I agreed to review them.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]Shortly thereafter, a package arrived in the mail. When I opened it, frankly I knew I was seeing official government materials, but I didn't understand what I'd received, so I called him. It was then that Shamai explained that he was an FBI translator, responsible for translating tapes of Israeli diplomatic conversations which his agency was intercepting.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]He also explained that he was convinced from his work on these recordings that the Israel foreign ministry and its officials in this country were responsible for a perception management [url="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perception_management"]campaign[/url]directed against Iran. He worried that such an effort might end with either Israel or the US attacking Iran and that this would be a disaster for both countries. Though he knew he might be putting himself in jeopardy, if he did nothing, he risked looking back on a disaster which he might've helped avert.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]Lest anyone dismiss his concerns, note that Israel's former Mossad chief, Meir Dagan, a man known for extreme taciturnity,[url="http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/former-mossad-chief-israel-air-strike-on-iran-stupidest-thing-i-have-ever-heard-1.360367"]publicly warned[/url] that Ehud Barak and Bibi Netanyahu proposed to a senior ministerial committee in 2010 that Israel attack Iran. Dagan almost single-handedly persuaded a majority of the ministers to defer an attack and to try nonlethal means instead, such as the Stuxnet cyber-attack, which Israel is known to have devised with likely US assistance. The Mossad director called a military attack on Iran the "stupidest thing I've ever heard." He knew, as Anthony Cordesman has [url="http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090316_israelistrikeiran.pdf"]reported[/url], it would likely kill thousands of Iranians (directly) and Israelis (indirectly through revenge terror attacks), lead to massive responses by Iran and its proxies and possibly cause the closing of the Straits of Hormuz, a skyrocketing in world oil prices and potential economic catastrophe.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]This month, Haaretz published this [url="http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/diplomatic-maelstrom-1.384826"]frightening characterization[/url]of Barak and Bibi's current attitude on the subject:[/left][/size][/left][indent][size=4][left]Anyone who has spoken with Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak in small forums in recent months was astonished to hear a firm, determined, almost messianic tone regarding the nuclear threat and how it should be handled.[/left][/size][/left][/indent][size=4][left]So, the danger of such an attack is very real. As we used to hear characters intone in TV and movies about nuclear apocalypse during my 1960s youth: "This is not a drill."[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]Leibowitz knew I agreed with his pessimistic view of the situation, as I'd written on the subject before, and he figured I might have an interest in making these documents public. But first, I recognized the danger that this would pose to him, so we had many discussions about what to do with the material. I asked him for permission to consult confidentially with other journalists, as neither of us had leaked or published classified documents before.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]I warned him a number of times that publishing the material could have serious negative consequences. At the time, I only considered that he might lose his job or the right to practice law or that the government might harass him for what he did. I didn't consider the possibility that they might actually prosecute him for these leaks, which was what happened.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]After these consultations, we both decided to go forward, but in what we felt was a discreet, controlled way. I would leak portions of the transcripts in a format designed to conceal the source and the specific identity of those individuals overheard in the surveillance tapes. I did this for about a month and published about five posts, including one in The Guardian UK's [url="http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/may/13/aipac-iran-us-obama"]Comment is Free[/url].[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]The material published included references to Israeli diplomats briefing [url="http://www.richardsilverstein.com/tikun_olam/2009/04/30/israeli-diplomats-lobbied-obama-on-behalf-of-gaza-war-before-inauguration/"]President-elect Obama[/url] on Operation Cast Lead while the war was being prosecuted, presumably in an effort to persuade him of the importance of continuing it, despite the pressure the incoming president was under to speak out against it. They revealed private, late-night meetings between the Israeli ambassador and a key Obama operative at which they presumably discussed how and whether the war would end in relation to the president-elect's upcoming inauguration. Note that the war ended on January 18, and Obama was inaugurated on January 20. I'm certain this was no accident, but rather a carefully choreographed [url="http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/04/06/090406fa_fact_hersh?currentPage=all"]deal[/url] between the two sides. Obama never criticized the war publicly. Now we know why.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]I noted that an Israeli diplomat ghost wrote some or all of a Boston Herald op-ed attacking Iran, to which a prominent Jewish attorney and community leader signed his name. In Minneapolis, the local Jewish Community Relations Council (JCRC) briefed the[url="http://www.richardsilverstein.com/tikun_olam/2009/04/28/jcrc-colludes-with-israeli-embassy-in-monitoring-house-member-hostile-to-israel/"]Chicago Israeli Consulate[/url] on the travel schedule and a meeting it held with Rep. Keith Ellison, the first Muslim-American elected to Congress. Ellison, according to the tapes, was viewed as hostile to Israeli interests. In fact, the JCRC official told the Israeli diplomat that Ellison had just led a local trade delegation to [url="http://jeddah.usconsulate.gov/keith-ellison.html"]Saudi Arabia[/url] (a big no-no) and was planning to join Rep. Brian Baird (D-Washington) in a fact-finding mission to [url="http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2009117904_opinb26baird.html"]Gaza[/url] in the aftermath of the war. This trip, too. was viewed with alarm by both parties in the transcripts.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]"The JCRC director conceded implicitly in [url="http://www.ajwnews.com/archives/11103"]The American Jewish World[/url] that he monitored Ellison and reported to the consulate:[/left][/size][/left][indent][size=4][left]'As part of our work fostering a strong U.S.-Israel relationship, the JCRC communicates from time to time with the Consul General’s office in Chicago ... Accordingly, [i]the JCRC's conversations with the Consul General's office have included discussions about members of Minnesota’s Congressional delegation, including Representative Ellison[/i].'"[/left][/size][/left][/indent][size=4][left]In Texas, a member of Congress held a meeting with a prominent Jewish campaign donor and consular official to discuss ways of advancing Israel's legislative campaign against Iran, including punitive sanctions and alarming the US public with the dangers posed by that country and its supposed effort to produce a nuclear weapon.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]In September 2008, before one of the presidential debates, an Israeli operative attempted unsuccessfully to meet with a debate panelist in order to plant a question about war against Iran: Would the candidates take military action against that country or accept a nuclear-armed Iran? The Israelis did NOT want any question that asked what the candidates might do if Israel attacked Iran.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]Israeli diplomats were heard touting pro-Israel members of Congress and bad mouthing those viewed as hostile. There were tutorials in cultivation of members. These are [url="http://www.richardsilverstein.com/tikun_olam/2009/04/28/israeli-intelligence-operations-target-us-congressional-leaders/"]excerpts[/url] of a post I wrote on April 28, 2009, detailing the methods and goals of such cultivation:[/left][/size][/left][indent][size=4][left]... Last month, Israeli diplomats in Jerusalem, Chicago and Washington made a series of calls to review the status of relationships with the Midwest's members of Congress. Senior diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained to Israeli diplomatic personnel that the purpose of getting to know these elected officials was to advance Israel's agenda in Congress.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]Israeli diplomats are most interested in members of Congress who serve on the intelligence, defense, foreign affairs and appropriations committees since those deal with issues of most concern to Israel. This explains peripherally, why they would devote so much time and attention to cultivating Jane Harman, since she stood to become chair of the House intelligence committee if Pelosi had agreed to retain her on the committee (which she didn't).[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]The Israeli officials ... were annoyed at their inability to gain access to Sen. Russell Feingold despite the fact that his sister is a rabbi and has visited Israel. Note that a trip to Israel in their view is like a tetanus inoculation bestowing excellent pro-Israel health and antibodies against "pro-Arab propaganda."[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]When a diplomat described Rep. David Obey as not a great friend of Israel and borderline hostile, the DC embassy representative reminded his staff that they could schedule meetings with staff when Congress members are not available (which presumably would positively influence their boss).[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]... The Israelis have noted that Sen. John Thune introduced anti-Iran legislation in the last session and that Rep. Mark Kirk planned to introduce new punitive legislation targeting that country. The Israelis sang the praises of Sen. Sam Brownback, who planned a conference that would exert economic pressure on Iran. The D.C. embassy plans to follow up with him to encourage his plans.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]Sen. Clare McCaskill is a particular focus of the Israelis because she is a confidant of the president and a member of the armed services and homeland security committees. The Israelis plan to establish close relations with McCaskill and her staff. Another Missouri legislator, Russ Carnahan, receives no such royal treatment. He is viewed, like Obey, as not friendly to Israel. Why? Because during a meeting with him, he highlighted to the Israeli representative his sympathy for the poor people of Gaza. The reason for this sympathy in the eyes of the Israelis? The legislator was poisoned by information from the Arab lobby.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]... One Israeli diplomat said that members of the St. Louis Jewish community conveyed their "expectations" to Carnahan and reminded him on which side his bread was buttered.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]Israeli diplomatic staff have noted a problematic relationship with two Minnesota representatives, Keith Ellison and Betty McCollum. Though they consider Ellison, a Muslim, "not anti-Israel," they noted he was quite attentive to the Arab lobby. Clearly they were keeping a close eye on Ellison's schedule as they knew he was receiving an UNWRA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East] briefing that very day about conditions in Gaza ... The Israelis noted with displeasure that Ellison has teamed up with Washington State Rep. Brian Baird (the two visited Gaza together) ...[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]... The Israelis are monitoring a new Indiana representative Andre Carson who like Ellison is Muslim. But it seems they're playing "good Muslim, bad Muslim," as Carson, they noted, hasn't yet taken any "radical" positions and therefore might serve as a counter-weight to "bad Muslim" Ellison.[/left][/size][/left][/indent][size=4][left]In the process of publishing this material, the Israelis became aware that their security was breached. They expressed concern about it, considered various possibilities for the origin of the leak (a mole was one theory), but continued their conversations. Eventually, Shamai thought it wasn't a good idea to continue with our project as he didn't wish to compromise the FBI investigation any more than necessary. He asked me to destroy the files I had, which I did by burning them.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]Subsequently, late one night, I received an alarming phone call from Shamai in which he disjointedly disparaged my work, told me I was wasting my time and that everything I'd done was "silly." It was so out of character that I was completely befuddled by his behavior. At that point, I knew our working partnership was at an end. But I didn't consider at the time that perhaps he knew the FBI was already monitoring him and perhaps listening to the conversation.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]Several months later, I discovered that Shamai had been [url="http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/May/10-nsd-608.html"]indicted[/url]for leaking materials to me. I was shocked and troubled. But, largely, I felt powerless, since going public would only jeopardize him further. I consulted an attorney who warned me against it. I contacted friends of his, contributed to his legal fund and did whatever I could to defend him privately to journalists who contacted me.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]It is almost unheard of for the federal government to prosecute employees who leak to journalists. The last such prosecution was of Samuel Morison in the early 1980s. Morison, who leaked a photograph of an advanced Soviet battleship to a military publication in return for money, received about the same sentence as Shamai. The former was also eventually pardoned by President Bill Clinton. In contrast, the FBI translator acted purely out of principle, received no compensation and did nothing to harm US military interests nor did he help a US enemy, as it could be argued Morison may have done.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]I learned, this past summer, that Shamai was about to be released from prison. At around that time, I heard from Daniel Ellsberg on Facebook about one of the Israeli human rights cases about which I reported. I decided to confide in him about what had happened because I was beginning to form some ideas that my one-time partnership with Shamai should be more widely known.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]It was Ellsberg who'd likened Leibowitz to [url="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/world/24london.html"]Bradley Manning[/url] and called him a whistleblower. So, I contacted the Pentagon Papers leaker and I said to him that the Israeli activist was a whistleblower, but not in the traditional conception of the term. He didn't blow the whistle on the United States or one of its agencies or programs. Instead, he blew the whistle on surreptitious foreign diplomatic activity in this country which he felt jeopardized US interests.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]When The New York Times finally reported on this story earlier this month, the headline (though not the substance of the reporting) got the issues wrong as it focused on the US spying on Israel. That's not the story, as Israel no doubt spies on the US embassy in that country. The true story was why and how Israeli diplomats were intervening so obtrusively in US political life. This was one of the reasons the FBI needed to know what they were doing here.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]I went public for two reasons: one was to expose Israel's propaganda campaign in this country against Iran. But just as importantly, I wanted Americans to know why Shamai Leibowitz did what he did. I wanted them to know that not only was he a whistleblower, a profile in courage, but that he is a person of conscience, who faced the full force of the US government during his prosecution. I wanted the world to know Shamai was a sacrificial victim who deserved to be honored rather than imprisoned.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]Steve Rosen, when the government prosecuted him for receiving US government classified materials and leaking them to the Israeli government, got a gold-plated $8-million [url="http://www.forward.com/articles/10307/"]legal defense[/url]. His team was so strong that it fought for its clients tooth and nail and won a dismissal of all charges against them.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]Shamai had no well-funded organization at his back. No family trust fund to protect him. He faced the choice of a jail sentence or a lifetime of repaying legal fees (or bankruptcy). This is a choice that no one in his position should ever be forced to make. He, no doubt, took the choice that was least objectionable.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]Shamai's prosecution is part of an alarming, aggressive Obama administration pursuit of such whistleblowers - who have included James Sterling and Thomas Drake. Drake, in particular, just faced down the government and reached a plea deal in which he was legally [url="http://www.thenation.com/article/161376/government-case-against-whistleblower-thomas-drake-collapses"]vindicated[/url]. But he had to bankrupt himself to do so. Those civil liberties activists who hoped for more and better from this administration compared to the previous one have been disappointed. Shamai Leibowitz' prosecution is a black mark on the legacy of the Obama administration.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]I, too, face some jeopardy, though the government has never prosecuted a journalist for publishing a government leak. If they came after me, it would be a first. But we've learned, unfortunately, that anything's possible.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]In all fairness, I should add that the government never approached me to testify in this case. Though if Shamai had resisted a plea bargain, I undoubtedly would've been placed in the awkward position of being pressured to testify, as Judith Miller was. I wasn't contacted until after Leibowitz agreed to a plea bargain. And that questioning was not adversarial. Also the government agreed not to reveal my involvement and did not do so. That's at least some consolation.[/left][/size][/left][size=4][left]Finally, I think Americans should salute Shamai Leibowitz and wish him well. I know he has suffered a great deal and getting on with his life will be hard. If anyone deserves a break, he does.[/left][/size][/left][/quote]


[size=4][/size][/left]
Link to comment
Share on other sites

[quote name='Jamie_B' timestamp='1318531454' post='1044745']
[url="http://www.truth-out.org/why-i-published-us-intelligence-secrets-about-israels-anti-iran-campaign/1316550301"]http://www.truth-out...aign/1316550301[/url]
[/left]
[/quote]

Did Shamai Leibowitz's story change any way or approach the US had in dealing with Israel or Iran ? We don't need anyone to tell us that Israel doesn't like Iran and vice versa.

Shamai's reasoning, stated in court, was that he felt that there was a law being broken and that was why he released the information. Yet, why did he release information to a blogger (or whatever the guy is) and not a superior and/or other legal authorities ? Leibowitz was afterall a law school grad and should generally know that if somebody breaks the law you report them to legal authorities and not some blogger or whatever this other guy was. If he had a Top Secret clearance, as a contractor for the intelligence services, he also knew that what he released would subject him to the meatgrinder.
Link to comment
Share on other sites

[img]http://media.zenfs.com/en_us/News/AFP/photo_1316344192164-2-0.jpg[/img]

[img]http://media.zenfs.com/en_us/News/ap_webfeeds/f9635cfef24f6016fb0e6a7067006142.jpg[/img]

[img]http://media.zenfs.com/en_us/News/ap_webfeeds/586aa4d277a0d416fa0e6a7067006dbf.jpg[/img]

Coincidence ?...
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Archived

This topic is now archived and is closed to further replies.

×
×
  • Create New...